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Jennifer Leitch*

A Less Private Practice: Government
Lawyers and Legal Ethics

Government lawyers are public servants and legal professionals. How they differ
from private lawyers has much to do with whom they purport to represent and
how they exercise power as a lawyer. I will look at a particular case-study—the St.
Anne’s Residential school adjudication. This case study illustrates the challenges
that government lawyers face in fullling their professional duty within a traditional
private lawyer framework. St. Anne’s Residential School involved some of the
most egregious physical, sexual and psychological abuse of Indigenous children
between 1941 and 1972. St. Anne’s Residential School litigation is used as a
cautionary (and truly tragic) tale regarding the problems associated with applying
a private lawyer model of professional ethics to government lawyers acting in a
particular adversarial context. This paper will canvass some of the more serious
problems that arose in respect of the St. Anne’s IAP litigation and provide an
important lens through which to examine a different approach to government
lawyering that engages some suggestions for developing an ethical approach
that better suits the responsibilities and challenges of government lawyers. Such
suggestions engage a justice-seeking ethic that is cognizant of the powerful role
that government lawyers play in our legal system and one that is more consistent
with meaningful reconciliation.
Les avocats du gouvernement sont des fonctionnaires et des professionnels du
droit. Ce qui les différencie des avocats en pratique privée tient en bonne partie aux
personnes qu’ils prétendent représenter et la façon dont ils exercent leur pouvoir
en tant qu’avocat. J’examinerai une étude de cas particulière : la décision dans
l’affaire du pensionnat Sainte-Anne. Cette étude de cas illustre les dés que les
avocats du gouvernement doivent relever pour remplir leur devoir professionnel
dans un cadre traditionnel d’avocat en pratique privée. Le pensionnat St. Anne a été
le théâtre de certains des plus graves abus physiques, sexuels et psychologiques
commis à l’encontre d’enfants autochtones dans le système des pensionnats entre
1941 et 1972. L’affaire du pensionnat Ste-Anne sert d’avertissement (et constitue
un récit vraiment tragique) concernant les problèmes associés à l’application d’un
modèle d’éthique professionnelle s’appliquant aux avocats en pratique privée aux
avocats du gouvernement agissant dans un contexte accusatoire particulier. Dans
le présent article, nous examinons certains des problèmes les plus graves qui sont
survenus lors de l’audience du processus d’évaluation indépendant (PEI) relatif
au litige du pensionnat Ste-Anne, et nous présentons une nouvelle optique pour
l’exercice de la profession d’avocat au sein du gouvernement. Nous formulons
quelques suggestions pour développer une approche éthique mieux adaptée aux
responsabilités et aux dés des avocats du gouvernement. De telles suggestions
engagent une éthique de la recherche de la justice qui tient compte du rôle puissant
que les avocats du gouvernement jouent dans notre système juridique et qui est
plus cohérente avec une réelle réconciliation.
*
Jennifer Leitch was a visiting professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, an adjunct Instructor
at Trinity College, University of Toronto and a Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Forum on
Civil Justice, Osgoode Hall Law School. I would like to thank Allan Hutchinson, Richard Devlin and
David Schulze for taking the time to review this paper and for their thoughtful contributions to its
development.
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Introduction
It is accepted wisdom that government lawyers are a special kind of
lawyer. They operate in a different context to private lawyers: they are
public servants as well as legal professionals. As such, it seems odd that
they would be governed by the same set of professional expectations and
ethical duties as private lawyers. At the very least, it might be thought
that there would be a sub-category of rules and regulations that would
canvass and account for the differences between the professional contexts
of government lawyers and private lawyers. Although most commentators
take for granted that these differences should warrant a different approach,
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it remains the case that government lawyers are lumped in with private
lawyers when it comes to the application of ethical rules. This presents
challenges among government lawyers and beyond the sphere of
government lawyers when setting expectations and assessing conduct.1
It is a perplexing situation. Not surprisingly, it results in anomalies and
confusion in determining what government lawyers should do by way of
ethical conduct and professional propriety.
In this paper, I want to explore these anomalous situations and dispel
some of the confusion that surrounds the ethical roles of government
lawyers. After introducing some of the important notions that inuence
and frame the work of government lawyers, I look at a particular casestudy—the St. Anne’s Residential school settlement adjudication. It
illustrates and exemplies the challenges and troubling manifestations
that government lawyers face in fullling their professional and public
duties within a traditional and private lawyer framework. My focus is not
only the inadequacy of an approach that treats government lawyers the
same as private lawyers, but also the practical problems and pitfalls that
this creates for government lawyers in fullling their ethical duties and
professional responsibilities. However, there is little point in being merely
critical in focus; these failings have already been amply documented.2
Instead, I advance a series of proposals and suggestions for how to develop
an ethical and professional imperative that is better suited to the particular
context and challenges of government lawyering. These proposals and
suggestions are grounded in a ‘justice’ ethic; an ethic that already serves
to inform certain government lawyers’ practice. As such, my ambition is
to utilize a critical approach to lay the foundations for a more constructive
proposal that might be examined and expanded going forward.
Part I canvasses and critically examines the modes of professional
regulation that infuses the government lawyer’s practice and conduct
including the provincial and territorial codes of conduct, the Prosecutorial
1.
Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering-Duties and Ethical Challenges of Government
Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2018) at xxvii.
2.
Brent Cotter, “The Legal Accountability of Governments and Politicians: A Reection Upon
Their Roles and Responsibilities” (2008) 2 JPPL 63 [Cotter, “Legal Accountability”]; Brent Cotter,
“The Evolving ‘Public Interest’ Dimensions of Professional Ethics for Lawyers” (2007) 13:2
Canterbury L Rev 155 [Cotter, “Evolving ‘Public Interest’”]; Adam M Dodek, “Lawyering at the
Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of
Law” (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1; Allan C Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 2nd
ed (Toronto: Irwin, 2006); Abbe Smith, “Can you be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?” (2001)
14:2 Geo J Leg Ethics 355; Lauren Soubise & Alice Woolley, “Prosecutors and Justice: Insights from
Comparative Analysis” (2018) Fordham Int’l L J [forthcoming], online: Social Science Research
Network <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175587> [perma.cc/56XA-CD24]; John
Mark Keyes, “Loyalty, Legality and Public Sector Lawyers” (2019) 97:1 Can Bar Rev 129.
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Deskbook, the rule of law and the public interest. Part II introduces the St.
Anne’s Residential School litigation and more particularly, the disclosure
and related challenges as well as incomplete narratives that occurred
in respect of the independent assessment process involving St. Anne’s.
Included in this section is a survey of the government lawyers’ positions
respecting certain of these issues and a critique of those positions. The nal
section of this paper—Part III—proposes a new direction for government
lawyers in the form of a justice-seeking ethic and in so doing, highlights
as well as responds to the critiques of such an ethic. Important to this
discussion is how such a new ethical approach would be operationalized.
I. Government lawyers and professional codes of conduct
Two thousand six hundred lawyers employed by the government of
Canada comprise the Federal Crown Counsel. These lawyers work for the
Department of Justice, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada as well
as provide in-house legal services to various government departments,
federal agencies, and tribunals.3 They are public servants practicing law in
the service of the Crown.4 Additionally, across the provinces, there are a
myriad of lawyers working in similar capacities at the provincial level for
the provincial attorney general as well as other provincial governmental
departments. Considering the general context of litigation and litigationrelated work, the various government departments (and, in certain cases,
Cabinet) generally act as instructing clients to government lawyers. A vast
number of these government lawyers function essentially as litigation
counsel working on behalf of a government department or agency. In so
doing, they “consult with their clients [the various departments], give them
legal advice and receive instructions from those clients on the approaches
and positions to be taken in litigation.”5 This work encompasses a broad
spectrum of civil litigation topics. Moreover, part of the mandate of the
federal as well as the provincial attorney-generals is to manage the legal
affairs of the various government departments and agencies by providing
advice as well as conducting litigation on behalf of those various
departments, agencies and tribunals. For the purposes of the discussion
in this paper, the term government lawyers contemplates those lawyers

3.
See “Association of Justice Counsel (AJC-AJJ)” (last updated 11 September 2019), online:
Association of Justice Counsel <ajc-ajj.net/> [perma.cc/5TTY-78J4].
4.
Sanderson, supra note 1 at xxiii.
5.
Attorney General of Canada, The Attorney General of Canada’s Directive on Civil Litigation
Involving Indigenous Peoples (Ottawa: The Attorney General of Canada, 2019) at 5, online (pdf):
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ijr-dja/dclip-dlcpa/litigation-litiges.pdf>
[perma.cc/N2XE-BP57]
[Litigation Directive].
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employed by the Department of Justice, the provincial counterparts as
well as those representing a particular government department.6
Across Canada, the provincial and territorial law societies are
responsible for governing the lawyers permitted to practice within that
province and do so through the Rules of Professional Conduct. This applies
in respect of the federal as well as provincial and territorial government
lawyers located in a particular provincial jurisdiction. In addition, recent
iterations of the Model Code of Professional Conduct generated by the
Federation of Law Societies recommend the standards generally expected
of lawyers across the country and are, in many respects, consistent with
the provincial codes.7 This is a consideration that is particularly relevant in
the context of federal government lawyers who may be situated in different
jurisdictions throughout Canada. In accordance with these professional
codes of conduct, much of the private lawyer’s professional duties and
responsibilities ow from and are dened in terms of their engagement
with clients within the adversarial framework. Private lawyers operate on
the basis of an ‘enlightened self-interest’ in the sense that serving their
client’s interests will ultimately serve their professional self-interests. In
many respects, the adversarial context has fostered a singular commitment
to the primary furtherance of the client’s interests. Correspondingly, this
singular commitment to the client’s interests (to the relative exclusion
of most other interests) is reected in the dominant ‘zealous advocate’
approach to lawyering that permeates legal ethics. This model tends to
inform much of the professional codes of conduct that regulate all lawyers
as well the courts’ interpretation of lawyers’ duties and responsibilities.8
Moreover, the professional culture of lawyers reects a continued
adherence to the neutral partisanship model of lawyering that is consistent
with notions of the zealous advocate.
However, this approach to legal ethics is not without its challenges.
The adversarial framework tends to perpetuate a hierarchy of duties and
responsibilities that places zealous advocacy and client autonomy at its peak.
In keeping with these notions of client autonomy and zealous advocacy, the
adversarial framework encourages and, in many circumstances, requires
that lawyers conduct themselves in certain ways. This conception of the
lawyer’s role assumes the lawyer to be ‘neutral’ vis-à-vis the morality of
6.
Sanderson, supra note 1 at xxiii.
7.
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, (amended
19 October 2019), online (pdf): <sc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Model-Code-October-2019.
pdf> [https://perma.cc/Q5VU-TJCP].
8.
See e.g., Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.2; See also Groia v The
Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27.
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their client’s views or actions. While this is not the only conceptualization
of the lawyer’s ethical role and other approaches exist,9 this traditional
model of professionalism does tend to inform current discourse on legal
ethics.10 However, these expectations raise concerns about the ethical
appropriateness of the lawyer’s ability to distance themselves not only from
the morality of a client’s position, but also from the actions taken on the
client’s behalf. “To the extent that lawyers are not ethically accountable for
the client’s objectives or the means used to achieve those objectives, there
is little incentive to engage in a contemplative analysis of the steps they
take in the client’s name.”11 The result is the creation of an environment in
which lawyers are incentivized to exploit any advantage the system allows
on behalf of their client.12 The further consequence is a marginalization
of the lawyers’ competing duties to the legal system and the public. Such
considerations are often rationalized in the criminal defence context when
the lawyer, in acting for an accused, must take certain steps (like crossexaminations that discredit adversarial witnesses) in order to serve her
client’s best interests.13
In an adversarial system, neutral partisanship is more often than not
used to justify behaviour that is unnecessary for lawyers to do their jobs:
behaviour such as the adoption of unreasonable or unsound positions or
use of tactics that obfuscate the process to a party’s advantage. Moreover,
the adversarial system, “expects parties to be selsh in their arguments,
creates incentives to hide evidence, and rewards parties whose attorneys
are the most skilled and well-funded.”14 Thus, the debate about the scope
and appropriateness of this framework as the underpinning of lawyers’
professional conduct is more often than not examined in a legal context that,
in theory, pits individual private parties against the state or alternatively,
private parties against each other. In these contexts, the question of legal

9.
For an alternative approach, see Trevor CW Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 46:1
Osgoode Hall LJ 51; Deborah L Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
10. For a very recent reference to the zealous advocate approach to lawyering (particularly in the
government lawyering context) see Andrew Flavelle Martin & Candice Telfer, “The Impact of the
Honour of the Crown on the Ethical Obligations of Government Lawyers: A Duty of Honourable
Dealing” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 443 at 446.
11. Jennifer Leitch, “Lawyers and Self-Represented Litigants: An Ethical Change of Role” (2017)
95:3 Can Bar Rev at 677.
12. C Sampford & C Condlln, “Educating Lawyers for Changing Process” in Charles Sampford,
Sophie Blencowe & Suzanne Condlln, eds, Educating Lawyers for a Less Adversarial System (Sydney:
Australia, The Federation Press, 1999) 173 at 178.
13. Elaine Craig, “The Ethical Identity of Sexual Assault Lawyers” (2017) 41:1 Ottawa LR 77 at 86.
14. Sandra Buhai, “Access to Justice for the Unrepresented Litigants” (2009) 42:4 Loy LA L Rev
979 at 982.
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ethics is limited to considering how the lawyers have conducted themselves
in the contest between the two private autonomous parties or as against the
state by its legal representatives. This approach to legal ethics often fails to
analyze conduct on behalf of the state. In this setting, each party assumes
responsibility for the handling of their case guided largely by self-interest
in maximizing their position.
The zealous advocate model is particularly problematic in the
context of government lawyers where the government entity ‘writ large’
is representational of a variety of legitimate and often competing public
interests as opposed to the private law model of one client with singular
interests.15 As a consequence of this dilemma, there is an argument that
government lawyers should not act as private law lawyers committed to
representing an individual client’s interests when addressing the legitimate
claims of citizens made against government.16
Historically, by contrast to private lawyers, government lawyers’
unique responsibilities and duties are “under-theorized in academic
scholarship.”17 However, it is noted that in recent years, there has been
an uptake in the scholarship around the particular ethical and professional
responsibilities of government lawyers; some of which is canvassed in
this paper. Given the government lawyer’s unique relationship as both a
lawyer acting on behalf of her public client, and an employee and public
servant acting on behalf of her governmental employer, an unfettered
loyalty grounded in notions of client autonomy and zealous advocacy can
obfuscate the government lawyer’s professional duties. Nowhere is this
more problematic than in the context of government litigation involving
Indigenous groups. For example, an unfettered loyalty to zealous advocacy
and neutral partisanship might well undermine the Honour of the Crown,18
and the corresponding broader objectives of the elected government,
including reconciliation. In fact, a pronouncement from the Canadian
Supreme Court specically highlighted the signicance of the Honour of
15. Government lawyers are not the only sub-set of lawyers that may face varied and competing
interests. Another example in this regard are in-house counsel who may need to take account of
senior management’s interests, the interests of the corporate board and the corporate entity itself. See
Hutchinson, supra note 2 at 183-186.
16. Stephen K Berenson, “Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should and Will Government
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest” (2000) 41 BCL Rev 789; Cotter, “Legal Accountability,” supra
note 2.
17. Dodek, supra note 2 at 4. See also Michael H Morris & Sandra Nishikawa, “The Orphans of
Legal Ethics: Why government lawyers are different—and how we protect and promote that difference
in service of the rule of law and public interest” (2013) 26 CJALP 171.
18. See Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 SCR 85 at 131, 71 DLR (4th) 193; R v Badger,
[1996] 1 SCR 771, 133 DLR (4th) 324; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forest), 2004
SCC 73; Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (AG), 2013 SCC 14.
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the Crown to meaningful reconciliation with First Nations.19 The Honour
of the Crown extends to the government, its departments, agencies and
ofcials in respect of its interactions with Indigenous peoples and requires
that all ofcials “act with honour, integrity, good faith and fairness in all
its dealings with Indigenous [P]eoples.”20 In interpreting the scope of
this requirement, at least one court has suggested that the Honour of the
Crown also extends to those representing the Crown, namely government
lawyers.21 Additionally, Andrew Martin has considered the need for a
special ethical obligation of honourable dealing when a government
lawyer is acting as the ‘face’ of the Crown in negotiations with Indigenous
groups.22 While this is an important discussion respecting government
lawyers’ ethical obligations in the particular context of negotiation, the
question that follows is what such a duty might look like in the context
of government lawyers engaged in litigation such as the residential
school litigation. This issue is particularly acute if it is meant to inform
the professional duties of government lawyers acting in cases involving
Indigenous People. 23
In light of this obligation, when taking instructions from and acting on
behalf of a particular government body, the Department of Justice lawyer
cannot and should not simply adopt a neutral partisan or ‘hired gun’
mentality that calls upon her to act as a zealous advocate and maintain
a largely unfettered duty of loyalty to the instructing client. While this
position informs much of the discussion in this paper, it is important to
note that others have an entirely different approach to the duty of loyalty
owed by government lawyers to their clients as zealous advocates.24
A recent directive of former Attorney General Jody Wilson-Raybould
speaks directly to the dilemma of how government lawyers should act
19. See Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004
SCC 74. Former Chief Justice McLachlin stated that, “[i]n all its dealings with Aboriginal Peoples,
the Crown must act honourably, in accordance with its historical and future relationship with the
Aboriginal Peoples in question. The Crown’s honour cannot be interpreted narrowly or technically, but
must be given full effect in order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1)” (ibid
at para 24).
20. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 202; See also Canada, Department of Justice “Principles respecting
the Government of Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples” (14 February 2018), online:
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/principles-principes.html> [perma.cc/3WE6-T94S] [Principles];
Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada Sets a Principled Foundation
for Advancing Renewed Relationships with Indigenous Peoples based on the Recognition of Rights”
(14 July 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/07/government_of_
canadasetsaprincipledfoundationforadvancingrenewed.html> [perma.cc/S898-733F].
21. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 202; See also Joseph v Canada, 2008 FC 574.
22. Martin & Telfer, supra note 10.
23. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 203.
24. Keyes, supra note 2.
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in litigation, particularly in cases involving Indigenous groups and in
the light of the objectives of reconciliation.25 Recognizing that a change
was needed in respect of how the Canadian government engaged with
Indigenous groups in the context of section 35 of the Constitution, the
government of Canada prepared the Principles respecting the Government
of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples. In accordance with
these principles, former Attorney General Wilson-Raybould sought to
more particularly articulate an approach to litigation that underscores
and furthers the objectives as outlined in the Principles. The directive
created in this regard seeks to advance an approach to litigation that
promotes resolution and settlement; pursue opportunities to narrow or
avoid litigation (while still recognizing that litigation may be needed in
certain instances as a means for Indigenous groups to assert a claim to
certain rights or entitlements); and ensure that the practice of litigation
between the government and Indigenous People is respectful of the
special relationship between the Crown and Indigenous Peoples. This last
consideration is meant to infuse Crown decisions about legal positions
taken, the language used in expressing those positions and the procedures
adopted to further those positions. For example, the directive suggests
that the government of Canada’s approach to litigation should be to assist
the court “constructively, expeditiously and effectively” when addressing
Indigenous claims.26 This suggests an approach that is less adversarial
in nature and, by contrast, more facilitative and more in keeping with
a robust commitment to the Honour of the Crown. However, despite
its good intentions, it is questionable whether this directive provides
sufcient guidance or clout, particularly when it is contrasted with
entrenched notions of professionalism as traditionally understood within
the adversarial context. While it is acknowledged that this directive was
not in force during much of the IAP at St. Anne’s, it remains to be seen
what effect this directive will have on government lawyers. Moreover, as
a directive, there is also a question about the force of its command as well
as applicability to future governments.
Notions of client autonomy and zealous advocacy are further
complicated in the context of government lawyers when the fact that the
client is also the lawyer’s employer is taken into account. In the private law
context, the ultimate fallback position for a lawyer when confronted with
25. Litigation Directive, supra note 5. This directive sought to outline an approach to litigation
engaging section 35 of the Constitution by the attorney general of Canada and her representatives that
is consistent with the Principles, supra note 20.
26. Litigation Directive, supra note 5.

324 The Dalhousie Law Journal

instructions from a client that run contrary to her ethical responsibilities
is withdrawal from the case. While there are some limitations placed on
this option under the Rules of Professional Conduct, generally speaking a
private lawyer can decline to continue to act for a client (or take a particular
client in the rst place), if that client requests that the lawyer act in what
the lawyer believes to be an unethical way. There are, of course, potentially
negative consequences associated with withdrawing from a case. But, in
theory, it is not likely to end a lawyer’s private practice, putting aside the
in-house corporate counsel and the lawyer whose practice is limited to
one large institutional client.27 The same may not be said of government
lawyers within the Department of Justice.
To the extent that they are instructed to take a particular position
or conduct a case in a particular fashion, there is likely no ‘walk away’
position for that government lawyer, short of resignation. In this manner,
government lawyers can be compared to junior associates in large law
rms, with little control over the les they are assigned and the management
of those les.28 This is also similar to the position of in-house counsel
who are essentially employed by the client they represent. In such legal
contexts, the lawyer’s decision not to follow instructions from the client
may precipitate their resignation.29 Where the only client a lawyer has is
also their employer, it is not practically feasible to suggest that the lawyer
will simply withdraw from the case. In fact, the only option available
to that government lawyer may be resignation. However, practically
speaking, this seems an untenable position for many government lawyers.
Therefore, any development of ‘government-specic’ legal ethics must
take account of this specic tension and, in so doing, create a space for the
government lawyer to adopt an ethical position that is different than her
employer. Such a development would avoid the problems such as those

27. Robert K Vischer, “Legal Advice as Moral Perspective” (2005) University of St Thomas School
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No 05-03, online: Social Sciences Research Network <papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=771006> [perma.cc/3B5G-ZSL6]. See also Keyes, supra note
2 at 138 in which Keyes suggests that if a public sector lawyer believes that the client is engaged
in wrongdoing, advises the client of same and the client persists, the lawyer must withdraw which,
effectively in the governmental context, would likely expose the lawyer to disciplinary action and
termination or resignation.
28. Allan C Hutchinson, “In the Public Interest: The Responsibilities and Rights of Government
Lawyers” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 at 114.
29. Hutchinson, supra note 2 at 187-188.
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faced by Edgar Schmidt and, most recently, Jody Wilson-Raybould.30 In
both cases, the lawyers ultimately had no choice other than to resign (or be
terminated) when faced with political pressure or policies that ran contrary
to the individual lawyer’s view of their ethical and professional duties as
lawyers employed by the government.
1. Additional professional regulation of government lawyers
Recognizing some of the limits of the existing rules of professional conduct
and their general inapplicability to the particular practice of government
lawyers, it is important to take brief account of the various sources of
professional guidance for government lawyers—Public Prosecution
Service of Canada Deskbook, the rule of law, the public interest, and the
pursuit of justice.
a. The Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook
Federal crown prosecutors (and the private sector agents acting on behalf
of the Crown) are regulated by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada
Deskbook.31 The Deskbook seeks to provide specic rules and guidelines
for prosecutors engaged in criminal prosecutions. The manual represents
the acknowledgement of, and need for, specic rules that will guide
government lawyers in conducting certain types of litigation.
Generally speaking, the Deskbook requires that prosecutors exercise
decision-making independent of the interests of the sitting government.
Underlying this independence is the concern that the prosecutorial branch
not be used as a tool of the government of the day to affect certain political
outcomes. Rather, the prosecutors remain accountable to the public in
respect of the decision-making they undertake. The recent controversy
respecting Prime Minister Trudeau and the allegation that he and/or senior
members of his staff unduly pressured the Attorney General Wilson-

30. Edgar Schmidt had been employed as general counsel in the legislative services branch of the
Department of Justice and during the course of his employment, he had sought a declaration that the
minister of justice was “not complying with his statutory duty to report to the House of Commons
on the inconsistency of government bills and regulations with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (the “Charter”) and the Canadian Bill of Rights (the “Bill of Rights”).” (Keyes, supra note 2
at 131); See also Simon Fodden, “Documents in the Edgar Schmidt Whistleblower Case” (23 January
2013), online: SLAW <www.slaw.ca/2013/01/23/documents-in-the-Edgar-Schmidt-whistleblowercase> [perma.cc/25G5-QJDZ]. The case of Jody Wilson-Raybould will be discussed in further detail
later in this paper.
31. Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa:
Attorney General of Canada, 2014), online: <www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/index.html>
[perma.cc/8QQC-C2C2] [Deskbook].
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Raybould speaks directly to this concern.32 It is alleged that the Prime
Minister sought to pressure the Attorney General not to prosecute a large
company based in Quebec. The company facing possible prosecution had
insinuated that it would leave Quebec if prosecuted; this would result in
the termination of thousands of jobs within the province. The political
fallout from such a departure could prove harmful to the government’s
standing in Quebec in an election year. In this regard, the allegations and
resulting resignation of the Attorney General cast a direct light on one of
the concerns sought to be addressed by the Deskbook.
Interestingly, the preface to the Deskbook notes that the guide is a
“permanent work in progress whereby federal prosecutors are cognizant
of the need for reform when policies become outdated or unclear.”33 The
recent allegations of political pressure reinforce ongoing critiques about
the Deskbook that include questions about how the rules are interpreted
and enforced internally within government. Also, it needs to be asked what
assistance the Deskbook might provide individual government lawyers
(and even the Attorney General herself) when confronted with ethical
dilemmas that are particular to the context of government lawyering. In
the Wilson-Raybould context, it would seem that despite the existence of
the Deskbook and professional rules of conduct, the Attorney General was
left with few options.
b. The rule of law
In addition to being guided by professional rules of conduct and the
guidelines set out in the Deskbook, there are additional principles that
are intended to guide government lawyers’ professional duties. Relevant
to the discussion in this paper, these are respect for the rule of law and
the responsibility to act in the public interest. As regards those duties
that might be imposed on government lawyers in respect of their duty
to promote the rule of law, it is worth noting Justice Laskin’s comments
in in Henco Industries Ltd v Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy
Council. He noted that the rule of law has a variety of different aspects that
include, among other things, “respect for minority rights, reconciliation
of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests through negotiation, fair
procedural safeguards for those subject to criminal proceedings, respect

32. “Timeline: The SNC Lavalin Controversy and Jody Wilson-Raybould,” Bloomberg (25 March
2019),
online:
<www.bnnbloomberg.ca/timeline-the-snc-lavalin-controversy-and-jody-wilsonraybould-1.1221040> [perma.cc/29DP-TT3L].
33. Deskbook, supra note 31.
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for Crown and police discretion….”34 Important within this articulation
is that the existence of different and potentially competing dimensions of
the rule of law in a given situation will require that those tasked with
upholding the rule of law adopt a more nuanced evaluation of how the rule
of law is to be accounted for in a particular circumstance. Adding further
complexity to an already contextualized analysis is the notion that, “the
rule of law does not require a decision-maker to act simply because a rule
of law would permit it.”35 Notwithstanding an expanded notion of the rule
of law as contemplated by Justice Laskin, the rule of law, as a source of
professional or ethical guidance for government lawyers, is more likely
to operate like a guiding principle rather than a standard of professional
conduct against which a particular government lawyer would be able to
measure or assess their own conduct.36 In other words, as a principle, the
rule of law may signal that government action is subject to review and
accountability but not necessarily how government lawyers are to conduct
themselves in the context of those reviews.
c. The public interest
Regarding the public interest, the scope and weight of the government
lawyer’s public interest duties remain a contested topic. Interestingly,
the private law context also struggles with a debate over the scope of
the private lawyer’s public interest duty. At the core of many of these
debates (in both spheres) is the difculty associated with dening the
‘public interest’ in a particular legal context. At best, this is a challenge
and at worst, it results in reliance on interests that might run contrary
to the public interest. For example, in the private law context, zealous
advocacy may be argued to be in the public interest because it works to
ensure that clients receive the best representation possible. However, the
consequence of dening the public interest in this manner is that there
are few limits placed on the conduct of the zealous advocate. Within the
context of the government lawyer’s public interest duty is the question
of “the role and responsibilities that government lawyers do and should
have in explicating or contributing to the government’s duty to act in
the public interest.”37 Complicating this further for government lawyers
is the situation where the government lawyer disagrees with the dened
public interest as articulated by their client (and elected ofcial). In such
34. Henco Industries Ltd v Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council, [2006] OJ No 4790 at
paras 142-143, 82 OR (3d) 721 (ONCA).
35. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 90.
36. Dodek, supra note 2.
37. Hutchinson, supra note 28 at 116.
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circumstances, it would be difcult to see how the government lawyer’s
professional conception of the public interest would be reconciled with
competing conceptions proffered by the elected ofcials who claim to be
reecting the populaces’ will. Thus, for government lawyers relying on
a public interest ethic raises two fundamental challenges; a challenge of
denition and a challenge associated with applying the public interest in a
complex political context (and in a way that may run contrary to the public
interest identied by the client-governmental department). Attempting
to provide some clarity respecting the government lawyer’s public law
duties, Elizabeth Sanderson draws on the various historical and statutory
frameworks that inuence the scope of these duties. She denes the public
interest as:
something of importance to the public as a whole rather than just to
a private individual. It can include many factors and cover matters
as diverse as public morality, judicial economy, scal responsibility,
management of contingent liability, and the search for justice and a just
result.38

As can be gleaned from such a denition, in any given circumstance,
what constitutes the ‘public interest’ for a government lawyer may include
a broad range of interests that shift in focus and strength depending on
the particular political and legal context. Such a broad range of interests
that vary from one legal context to another do not provide a basis for a
professional framework that promotes certainty and direction to lawyers
operating within that framework. Moreover, it does not address the
scenario where the government lawyer and the government client have
competing views on the public interest.
d. The pursuit of justice
In addition to the indeterminate demands of the rule of law and the
somewhat amorphous inuence of the public interest, there is an additional
ethical principle that informs and shapes certain government lawyers’
duties. This is the requirement that crown prosecutors, in pursuing and
securing convictions, seek justice. While this principle falls broadly within
the context of serving the public interest and, thus, may lend itself to a
variety of contextual interpretations, it means that the crown prosecutor’s
primary consideration is not to obtain a conviction, but rather to ensure that
justice is done through a fair trial on the merits.39 In R v Boucher, Justice
38. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 242.
39. Law Society of Ontario, supra note 8, Rule 5.1-3[1] (commentary 1—duty as prosecutor); R v
Boucher [1955] SCR 16, 20 CR 1 [Boucher].
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Locke noted that, “prosecuting counsel should regard themselves rather
as ministers of justice assisting in its administration than as advocates”
that act on instructions of an actual client.40 The consequence is that, “the
duty to represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law becomes
transformed by the duty to act in the interests of justice.”41 While at rst
glance, this duty might elicit a certain skepticism that tempered advocacy
is really about ‘saying mean things in a soft voice,’ the duty to seek justice
has informed specic prosecutorial duties.
Among other prosecutorial duties, the requirement to ‘do justice’
specically requires that crown prosecutors provide full disclosure
even where the disclosure has exculpatory effects for the accused.42
Linked closely with this notion of doing justice is a further obligation to
obtain and promote the truth regardless of the partisan positions of the
respective parties. Pursuant to an obligation to seek justice, the scope of
the prosecutor’s disclosure duties are different than the disclosure duties
placed on the private law lawyer acting within an adversarial context.
Again, in the private law context, it is understood that parties may be
required to produce all information that is relevant to the matters in issue,
but not be required to assist the opposing party in building its strongest
case. Moreover, despite disclosure being an essential part of the adversarial
process, it is not the only duty of crown prosecutors that is viewed
through a justice-based lens.43 On this basis, this paper recommends that
a justice ethic—already operationalized in certain government lawyering
contexts might be expanded to provide a meaningful and comprehensive
framework for ethical government lawyering beyond the sphere of crown
prosecutors.44
Generally speaking, the scope of the crown prosecutors’ justice ethic
is framed by law society rules, judicial pronouncements in the relevant
case law as well as internal guidelines published in the form of the

40. Boucher, supra note 39 at 20; See also W Bradley Wendel, Ethics and Law an Introduction,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 159.
41. Deborah McNair, “In the Service of the Crown: Are Ethical Obligations Different for Government
Counsel” (2005) 84:3 Can Bar Rev 501 at 515; See also Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2 at 14.
42. Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2; R v Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 326, 130 NR 277
[Stinchcombe]; See also Law Society of Ontario, supra note 8, Rule 5.1-3[1].
43. For example, the crown has a duty to ensure that the police investigations that support its cases
are complete (R v Spackman, 2009 CanLII 37920 (ONSC)) and that once the crown is notied of
relevant information, it cannot disregard the information. See R v MacNeil, 2009 SCC 3. Further
responsibilities of crown prosecutors extend to the prosecutor’s conduct during cross-examinations,
the presentation of evidence, representations made to court, and juries and treatment of self-represented
accused;. See Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2 at 14.
44. See text accompanying note 128, below.
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Deskbook.45 However, the justice ethic is not without its criticisms. For
example, “[C]anadian prosecutors individually and collectively enjoy
signicant independence. They are largely immune from regulation by
provincial law societies, from judicial review of exercises of prosecutorial
discretion, or for an action in wrongful prosecution.”46 At every stage of
the prosecutorial process, the prosecutor makes discretionary decisions
regarding investigations, the pursuit of certain charges, plea bargaining
and the process of trial. In this sense, prosecutors exercise a notable degree
of power over their processes.47 This exercise of discretion (deemed
somewhat necessary in the scope of criminal prosecutions) combined
with contestable meanings of justice raises questions about the efcacy
and consistency of a justice ethic. Thus, notwithstanding the express
recognition of the prosecutor’s obligation to seek justice, on any given
le, the crown prosecutors’ independence and discretion shrouds a review
of the application of the justice interest in a particular case.48
In the light of this patchwork of ethical and professional duties, this
paper discusses establishing a larger more consistent and comprehensive
guide for government lawyers acting in an adversarial capacity. Adopting
such a framework is particularly relevant to government lawyers operating
within various civil justice contexts including those lawyers acting in
cases of mass torts and class actions against the government (particularly
when claims involve allegations of mistreatment of vulnerable groups by
government agents) as well as environmental claims. It is also pertinent
where there is an array of competing public interests and groups,
marginalized or otherwise whose lives may be particularly impacted by
the decisions ultimately made. These instances call out for an underlying
frame of reference and set of guiding principles for the government lawyer
when making decisions regarding the government’s position and conduct
in a legal dispute. In conjunction with a justice ethic is the further notion
that, within government (as within different elds of private law), there
will be a need to add ‘mid-level’ rules that are tailored to respond to the
specic challenges that arise in a particular government practice-setting.49

45. Deskbook, supra note 31; Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2.
46. Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2 at 3.
47. Wendel, supra note 40 at 163.
48. Further criticisms of the justice ethic are discussed later in this paper in great detail. See text
accompanying note 131, below.
49. David B Wilkins, “Legal Realism for Lawyers” (1990) 104 Harv L Rev 468.
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II. St. Anne’s Residential School: A case study in government lawyer
ethics
St. Anne’s Residential School in Fort Albany, Ontario involved some of
the most egregious physical, sexual and psychological abuse of Indigenous
children between 1941 and 1972.50 The St. Anne’s Residential School
litigation is used as a cautionary (and truly tragic) tale regarding the
problems associated with applying a private law ‘zealous advocacy’ model
of professional ethics to government lawyers acting in a quasi-adversarial
context. However, St. Anne’s also provides an important lens through
which to examine a different approach to the ethical responsibilities of
government lawyers. This section of the paper briey introduces the St.
Anne’s Residential School litigation, contextualizes the objectives and
scope of the resolution of claims under the Independent Assessment
Process (IAP) created under the Indian Residential School Settlement
Agreement51 (IRSSA), and canvasses some of the problems that arose in
respect of the IAP at St. Anne’s.
1. The Independent Assessment Process under the IRSSA
Before examining the particular context of the litigation involving St.
Anne’s residential school, it is important to understand the IAP as part
of the IRSSA. As well, it is vital to situate the government lawyers’
responsibilities within IAP as well as the larger IRSSA negotiated between
the former students, churches, federal government, the Assembly of First
Nations and other Indigenous organizations. The IRSSA is a “Canada-wide
settlement encompassing residential school operations spanning more than
a century and includes and estimated 79,000 class members in total.”52
Article 6 of the IRSSA established the IAP as the means for claimants to
seek compensation for claims of serious physical abuse, sexual abuse, or
other wrongful acts suffered by individuals while at residential schools.
In Fontaine v Canada, Justice Brown described the IAP as a “modied
adjudicative process.”53 The other mode of compensation under the IRSSA
is the Common Experience Payment (CEP). As that term suggests, the
CEP was designed to compensate all previous students for their Indian
Residential School experience and the attendant lack of connection with

50. Jorge Barrera, “The Horror’s of St. Anne’s,” CBC News (29 March 2018), online:
<newsinteractives.cbc.ca/longform/st-anne-residential-school-opp-documents>
[perma.cc/4TC8GNCM].
51. “Settlement Agreement” (8 May 2006), online: Residential Schools Settlement <www.
residentialschoolsettlement.ca/settlement.html> [perma.cc/MKC9-JDQD] [IRSSA].
52. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2012 BCSC 839 at para 28 [Fontaine 2012 BCSC].
53. Ibid at paras 29-30.
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family and loss of culture and language.54 Compensation pursuant to the
CEP is available to everyone who resided in a residential school. Eligible
individuals receive a payment of $10,000 for at least one or part of one
year and then an additional $3,000 for each subsequent year.55 In addition,
claimants may seek compensation from an adjudicator pursuant to the IAP.
The IAP process is managed by the Indian Residential School
Adjudication Secretariat (IRSAS). The executive director of the IRSAS
has a dual reporting relationship to the chief adjudicator and the Deputy
Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs. The chief adjudicator, who is
court-appointed, reports directly to the supervising courts and is required to
have an ‘arms-length’ relationship with Indigenous and Northern Affairs.56
The Settlement Agreement Operations Branch (SAO) is a branch within
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada that performs Canada’s functions
as a respondent in the IAP claims resolution process.57 The government
lawyers engaged in individual IAPs are employed by the Department of
Justice.
The IAP process was designed to “facilitate the expedited resolution
of claims for serious physical abuse, sexual assaults and other abuse
resulting in serious psychological harm.”58 The IAP denes the harms that
are compensable and provides for a maximum compensation of $275,000
plus an additional $250,000 in actual income loss resulting from the
injury suffered by a claimant as a result of being a resident in a particular
residential school.59 At this point, the average compensation awarded to
claimants in the IAP has been approximately $91,000—considerably less

54. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2018 BCSC 63 at para 9 [Fontaine 2018 BCSC], aff’d 2019 BCCA
269. Please note that this case is currently on appeal to the SCC.
55. The average CEP payment is approximately $20,457. As of 2016, approximately 79,309 eligible
former students had received a CEP payment. See Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Statistics
on the Implementation of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement” online: <www.
aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1315320539682/1315320692192> [perma.cc/5BA4-XNRE].
56. See “About the Indian Residential School Adjudication Secretariat” (last updated 19 September
2019), online: Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat <www.iap-pei.ca/about-eng.php>
[perma.cc/59ER-7X4T] [IRSAS]. Note that as of July 2019, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada
was replaced by Indigenous Services Canada and Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs
Canada.
57. Fontaine v Canada (AG) 2016 ONCA 241 (appeal of the order of Justice Perell dated 6 August
2014 regarding disclosure and archiving of documents generated in the IAP processes) [Fontaine 2016
ONCA].
58. Baxter v Canada (AG), 2006 CanLII 41673 at para 7, 83 OR (3d) 481 (ONSC).
59. It is worth noting at as of January 2014, there were over $2 billion dollars in compensation
awarded in respect of 17,000 claims. See Fontaine v Canada (AG) 2014 ONSC 283 at para 69
[Fontaine 2014 ONSC]. This has subsequently been updated in the context of IAP proceedings.
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than the limits contemplated under the IRSSA.60 Since the commencement
of this process, approximately, 3.24 billion dollars has been paid out in
respect of about 26,703 IAP proceedings. Eighty-nine per cent of the
claims made in the IAP have been successful.61
In a quasi-inquisitorial fashion, it is the appointed adjudicator within
the IAP process who is responsible for questioning the claimant about
the details of the claim. The IAP is considered to be a form of litigation,
albeit a modied form that is supposed to take account of the particularly
sensitive nature of the claimants and claims brought forward.62 In fact,
early in the IRSSA process, Justice Winkler stated that the IAP was
“an opportunity to litigate their [claimant’s] claims in an extra-judicial
process.” In a subsequent decision, Justice Brown stated,
The purpose of the IAP is to provide a modied adjudicative proceeding
for the resolution of claims of serious physical or sexual abuse suffered
while at a residential school. The hearings are to be inquisitorial in nature
and the process is designed to minimize further harm to claimants. The
adjudicator presiding over the hearing is charged with asking questions
to elicit the testimony of claimants. Counsel for the parties may suggest
questions or areas to explore to the adjudicator but they do not question
claimants directly.
The hearings are meant to be considerate of the claimant’s comfort and
well-being but they also serve an adjudicative purpose where evidence
and credibility are tested to ensure that legitimate claims are compensated
and false claims are weeded out. It is strongly recommended that
claimants retain legal counsel to advance their claims within the IAP.63

Notwithstanding the quasi-inquisitorial nature of the IAP, the corresponding
powers of the adjudicators and the recognition of the sensitive nature of
the claims under the IAP, courts have also stressed the need for legal
representation for the claimants. Moreover, as noted in the case law and
reected in the certain positions adopted by government lawyers engaged
in the IAP, the scope and jurisdiction of the process has been subject
to debate. One of the questions that has dogged the process has been
whether the IAP process is a continuation of the pre-existing litigation or a
separate compensation scheme. The signicance of this debate lies in the
application of certain litigation-related duties and responsibilities and the

60. “Independent Assessment Process (IAP) Statistics” (30 September 2019), online: Indian
Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat <www.iap-pei.ca/stats-eng.php> [perma.cc/H42W3HLA] [IAP Statistics].
61. Ibid.
62. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59.
63. Fontaine 2012 BCSC, supra note 52 at para 29.
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powers of the supervisory courts to review the IAP decisions. These duties
are in play in traditional litigation processes and subject to the principles
of procedural fairness. Additionally, another issue that has been raised in a
number of Requests for Direction (RFD) under the IRSSA is whether the
terms of the IRSSA essentially forms the total landscape of the signatories’
duties and responsibilities in the IAP.64 This is particularly relevant in the
context of the internal review process of adjudicators’ decisions and the
role of the supervisory judges in each province.
In terms of procedure, a claimant commences the IAP process with an
application not dissimilar to a private law pleading: the claimant outlines
details of the harm or abuse, including dates, times, parties involved in
the wrongdoing as well the individual’s request for compensation. If the
claim is not previously settled, a hearing is held in front of an adjudicator.
At the hearing, the adjudicator’s job is to evaluate the credibility of the
claimant’s claim, assess the harm to the claimant and determine appropriate
compensation.65 Adjudicators are expected to be “highly-qualied
individuals selected by all-party consensus, who receive intensive training
approved by the IAP oversight committee and ongoing mentoring by
the chief adjudicator and other senior adjudicators.”66 The main parties
to the hearing are the claimant, their counsel (if they have counsel),
representatives of the government of Canada as well as representatives of
any relevant religious order that had been involved in running the school
in question. Hearings are private and condential. Moreover, an alleged
perpetrator may be excluded when the claimant is testifying and there is
no right of cross-examination by any alleged perpetrator.67 This is relevant
in terms of the original design of the process being sensitive to the nature
of the claims and the particular types of harms suffered by the claimants
participating in the IAP. Parties may call witnesses; however, the
specially-trained adjudicators manage the hearing, question the claimant

64. These contrasting views were very recently considered by the SCC in the case of JW v Canada
(AG), 2019 SCC 20 [JW SCC]. In that case, the majority held that while the parties do not have a
broad right to judicial intervention, they do have a right to the implementation of the terms of the
agreement. As such, the “existence of the agreement was contingent on judicial approval, and judicial
approval, in turn, was contingent on ongoing judicial supervision” (ibid at para 23). However, in this
context, judicial supervision means that the supervisory judges have an ongoing duty to supervise the
administration and implementation of the agreement and ensure that the agreement is adhered to; not
a broad right of judicial intervention.
65. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2017 ONCA 26 at para 15 [Fontaine 2017 ONCA].
66. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2017 BCSC 946 at para 14.
67. The Attorney General of Canada v JW and Reo Law Corporation et al, 2017 MBCA 54 at para
47 [JW Appeal]; Fontaine 2016 ONCA, supra note 57 at para 48.
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or witnesses and provide a decision with reasons.68 The lawyers present
do not ask questions of the claimant directly, but may request that the
adjudicator pursue certain lines of inquiry regarding the claimant’s claim
(presumably including the scope or nature of the claim).
Under the IAP, the claimant does not face direct cross-examination
by the government lawyers. The claimant must prove his or her claim
on a balance of probabilities. In structuring the process in this way, there
are certain benets provided to the claimant, namely, closed hearings at
a location of the claimant’s choosing, and the availability of a support
person and/or trained counselors at the hearing.69 However, now that the
process is almost complete, the question that remains to be explored in
greater detail is how the claimants themselves experienced the IAP.
2. The importance of narratives to the IRSSA and the IAP
Pursuant to its disclosure obligations under the IRSSA, the government
of Canada is obligated to provide information about the IAP claimants,
the residential school in question as well as information about alleged
perpetrators (persons of interest (POI) reports) and/or allegations of abuse
at a particular school.70 Consistent with these obligations is the further
requirement that the government prepare a narrative in respect of each
of the residential schools. These narratives are essentially a history of a
particular residential school prepared by the government and are intended
to include reference to any abuse that took place at the school in question.
Not insignicantly, the obligation to disclose information and prepare
the narrative is ongoing in the sense that as new information becomes
available, the Canadian government is obligated to include it and update
the narrative accordingly.71 As was noted by Justice Perrell, “Canada is
not doing a favour in providing school narratives or POI reports; it is
performing a hard-bargained for contractual promise.”72 Additionally,
claimants and their counsel are entitled to documents collected in respect
68. Fontaine 2017 ONCA, supra note 65 at para 14; Fontaine 2012 BCSC, supra note 52 at paras
29-30.
69. JW Appeal, supra note 67 at para 47.
70. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 97.
71. Under the IRSSA, supra note 51 the government has an obligation to “search for, collect and
provide a report about the persons named in the Application Form as having abused the Claimant,
including information about those persons’ jobs at the residential school and the dates they worked
or were there, as well as any allegations of physical or sexual abuse committed by such persons,
where such allegations were made while the person was an employee or student” (ibid at Schedule D
Appendix VIII “Government Document Disclosure”) [emphasis added]. Additionally, the government
is required to gather documents about the residential school that the claimants attended and write a
report summarizing those documents. These Narratives are also available to the claimant (as well as
the underlying documents if requested); See also Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at paras 99-100.
72. Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 ONSC 4061 at para 68 [Fontaine 2015 ONSC].
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of a particular school. In the context of the IAP, the information contained
in the narrative may be used by the adjudicator as a basis for fact-nding
or credibility respecting a particular claimant’s claim of abuse.73 In fact,
the IRSSA contemplates adjudicators taking previous criminal or civil
trial into account in the IAP hearings.
3. Disclosure and related challenges in the IAP at St. Anne’s Residential
School
The government and its lawyers engaged in the IAP at St. Anne’s Residential
School prioritized traditional notions of the adversarial process over the
truth-seeking and claim resolution objectives of the IRSSA. However,
understanding the historical background of abuse, investigations and
resulting civil and criminal litigation contextualizes the ethical challenges
that arose in respect of the litigious nature of certain of the hearings at St.
Anne’s.
a. The OPP disclosure
Between 1992 and 1996, the Ontario Provincial Police conducted an
extensive investigation into abuse allegations at St. Anne’s. The abuse
allegations spanned over 30 years and included serious physical, sexual
and psychological abuse of students.74 There were over 992 statements
taken from 700 individuals. The OPP obtained over 7000 documents from
the religious organizations connected to the school. Ultimately in 1997,
seven employees of St. Anne’s were charged with various abuse-related
crimes and six of those individuals were convicted. The OPP information,
including investigative documentation as well as trial transcripts, were not
referenced in the rst narratives that the government prepared pursuant
to the IRSSA. Examples of the signicant documentation not disclosed
included expert medical evidence transcripts of Crown witnesses in the
criminal trials respecting the type of abuse suffered at St. Anne’s. The
medical evidence had been used by the crown prosecutors to articulate the
nature of the abuse at St. Anne’s for the purpose of securing convictions in
the criminal prosecutions.
73. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 101.
74. Barrera, supra note 50: In a report prepared by the CBC documenting the abuse, survivors said
that “nuns, priests and lay brothers would hit students with large straps, small whips, beaver snare
wire, boards, books, rulers, yardsticks, sts and open hands….Sometimes, students were locked away
in the dark basement for hours at a time. They also told investigators of being force-fed porridge,
spoiled sh, cod liver oil and rancid horse meat that made students sick to the point of vomiting on
their plates. They said they were often forced to then eat their vomit. There were numerous allegations
of sexual abuse involving nuns, priests, lay brothers and other staff, ranging from fondling and forced
kissing to violent attacks and nighttime molestation.” Ontario Provincial Police les obtained by CBC
News reveal the history of abuse at the notorious residential school that built its own electric chair.
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By 2000, a signicant number of civil actions had been commenced
by former students against the federal government in respect of the abuse
that had taken place at St. Anne’s over a 30-year period. The government
was named as a defendant in those actions.75 Ultimately, these actions
were deemed dismissed pursuant to the terms of the IRSSA and continued
as claims under the IRSSA.76 In 2003, prior to the dismissal of the class
actions, the government of Canada had obtained an order for production
of the OPP records for use in the civil actions it was defending in respect
of St. Anne’s. In undertaking to obtain those OPP records, the government
of Canada claimed such information was relevant and necessary for its
defence of the civil actions. As a consequence of moving to obtain these
records, the government had, at its disposal, a vast and extensive record of
the history and scope of abuse at St. Anne’s for the purpose of defending
civil actions pre-IRRSA.
Notwithstanding being in possession of this extensive documentation,
the government made no mention of that same documentation once the
civil actions were settled pursuant to the IRSSA and the IAP proceedings
were initiated. The reality was that if class actions had continued against
the government as a defendant, the government would have had ongoing
disclosure requirements pursuant to the discovery process in litigation. In
fact, the government had obtained the criminal records for the purpose
of defending the class actions. Instead, pursuant to the IRSSA, these
disclosure obligations were essentially replaced by the requirement that
the government prepare a narrative under the IRSSA. Arguably, the
government interpreted the scope of the disclosure requirement under the
IRSSA in a different fashion. In the context of the IRSSA, the government
took the position that it was “barred from producing the documents because
they obtained the documents from the OPP subject to an undertaking that
it would not disclose the documents to any third party.”77 The government
also claimed that requiring it to produce the St. Anne’s documentation
required the government to seek documents from third parties and that
requiring this would be “burdening the government of Canada with this
obligation.”78

75. See Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 36 which describes the civil actions commenced
in respect of St. Anne’s.
76. Ibid.
77. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the
Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, (2015)
at 27, online (pdf): <nctr.ca/assets/reports/Final%20Reports/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf>
[perma.cc/A278-YPWM].
78. Ibid at 27-28; See also Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 24.

338 The Dalhousie Law Journal

IAP hearings in respect of the abuse allegations involving St. Anne’s
were heard from 2007–2014, although challenges regarding certain of
the adjudicator’s decisions have continued in the supervising courts. The
government’s non-disclosure raises signicant concerns about the scope
of the information available to the adjudicators; the claimants’ abilities
to establish abuse allegations and the scope of the compensation. One of
the consequences was that a limited number of claimants were initially
unable to establish the facts or timelines necessary to prove their claims
of abuse under the IAP. Equally signicant is the concern that the failure
to produce information undermined the objectives of the IRSSA and
reconciliation more generally. This was despite there being substantial
information within the government’s control regarding the history of
abuse at St. Anne’s. In fact, during the course of the IAP process involving
St. Anne’s, the government was obligated to prepare multiple versions of
the narratives and POI reports.79 These narratives with differing degrees
of factual detail were created despite the government having access to the
relevant information and materials from 2003 onward.
b. The incomplete narratives of St. Anne’s
In 2007–2008, Canada prepared its rst narrative (post-IRRSA) in respect
of St. Anne’s and in so doing, represented that four complaints not part
of the OPP investigation constituted all of the identiable complaints and
allegations known by the government. The narrative made no mention of
the OPP documentation, the numerous allegations of sexual and physical
abuse at St. Anne’s or the employees’ convictions and further suggested
that there were no further incidents found in the documentation relating to
sexual abuse at St. Anne’s.80 While the narratives are prepared by Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development Canada (as it was known at the time),
the federal government and its lawyers were in possession of signicant
portion of information and documentation from 2003 onward.81 In effect,
they had been made aware of the deciencies in the narrative; however,

79. Fontaine 2015 ONSC, supra note 72; Colin Perkel, “Court Urged to Clear up ‘Mystery’ of
Hidden Residential School Documents,” CBC News (24 March 2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/
news/indigenous-court-urged-mystery-residential-school-documents-1.4040225> [perma.cc/KK8TG5SM].
80. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 126.
81. See text accompanying note 93, below. Specically, Justice Perell noted that the OPP documents
and transcripts had been stored in the federal Department of Justice’s ofces in Toronto since 2003 but
not provided to AANDC.
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they made no attempt to correct the narrative for over a year.82 When
confronted with these inaccuracies in the original narratives (given the
OPP documentation) in the course of the RFD heard by Justice Perell, the
government took the position that the omissions were not of “any moment
or consequence.”83 In 2012, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) requested that Canada produce copies of all records relating to
any criminal convictions at all residential schools.84 In response, Canada
advised that it did not maintain a list of convictions. Contemporaneously,
the government brought an RFD challenging its obligations under the
IRSSA to produce the OPP documentation. In 2013, Canada prepared a
new narrative that made reference to the OPP charges and convictions but
made no reference to the criminal trial transcripts or OPP documents in the
Department of Justice’s possession. The government took the position that
it had not disclosed the criminal trial transcripts in its possession because
the transcripts were irrelevant, inadmissible in respect of the assessment of
individual claims and outside the scope of Canada’s disclosure obligations
under the IRSSA.85 By contrast, it would appear that the disclosure
obligations placed on private lawyers in litigation would be signicantly
more demanding than the government’s interpretation of its responsibilities
under the IRSSA; which included a responsibility to prepare narratives and
POI reports in respect of each of the residential schools including details
of any complaints of abuse, those involved and what happened regarding
those complaints.86 In contrast to other interpretive arguments asserted
by the government respecting the scope of the IRSSA, the government
asserted “signicant discretion in how it structures and complies with its
obligations”87 as it pertains to the Narratives and POI reports.
c. Government’s position on disclosure
In addition to the RFDs brought by the TRC and the government,
approximately 60 of the St. Anne’s claimants also brought an application
in the form of an RFD requiring the government produce the OPP records
as well as all criminal and civil transcripts of proceedings involving abuse

82. Goldblatt Partners, “Independent Assessment Process for Abuse Victims of Indian Residential
Schools” (6 March 2014), online: <goldblattpartners.com/experience/class-action-cases/post/
independent-assessment-process-for-abuse-victims-of-residential-schools/>
[perma.cc/H4EN6MM9].
83. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 127.
84. Ibid at para 12.
85. Ibid at para 124. Ultimately, Justice Perell ordered that the Government produce the copies of the
OPP documents in its possession to the Commission.
86. See supra note 71 above outlining the duties of government to prepare a narrative.
87. Fontaine 2015 ONSC, supra note 72 at para 61.
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allegations at St. Anne’s and amend the narratives for St. Anne’s.88 During
the course of this contest, lawyers for the government indicated that (i) it
was compliant with its obligations under the IRSSA; (ii) the government’s
disclosure obligations under the IRSSA did not extend to documents
outside its possession; (iii) the government did not have to produce OPP
documents in its control pursuant to the deemed undertaking rule; (iv) the
statements made to the OPP regarding particular abuse allegations were
not admissible in an IAP hearing because live testimony was required
and/or the OPP information was not probative; and (v) the government
was not obligated to produce information about abuse allegations about
persons of interest once they left the school.89 In its submissions, the
government further maintained that it retained the right to argue relevance
and admissibility of the OPP documents, if ordered produced, at each
IAP proceeding. As a nal position, the government argued that the
supervising court would not have jurisdiction to appoint an individual to
review settled claims to determine if they were prejudiced by the ‘alleged’
non-disclosure.90 It is worth noting that subsequent to Justice Perell’s
order to produce the OPP documentation, in August 2014, the government
produced over 12,000 documents. However, the material “including trial
transcripts, witness statements to police, even certicates of conviction,
was heavily redacted.”91 In fact, this redaction included the names of
perpetrators as well the names of possible witnesses.
In addition to maintaining these positions on the OPP disclosure,
certain of the government’s positions on disclosure in the St. Anne’s
IAP process do not meet a minimum standard required of parties in
private civil litigation. For instance, the government exerted privilege
over a variety of documents relating to the civil actions involving St.
Anne’s, but, in so doing, failed and/or refused to identify the privileged
documents in question; contrary to established practice under provincial
procedural rules and relevant case law.92 Instead of complying with basic
disclosure standards, the government made blanket claims of privilege

88. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, supra note 76 at 27; Fontaine 2014 ONSC,
supra note 59.
89. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at paras 143, 216-217.
90. Ibid at para 24.
91. Tonda MacCharles, “Heavily edited Residential School documents an Obstruction of Justice,
NDP says,” The Toronto Star (4 September 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/09/04/
heavilyedited_residential_schools_documents_an_obstruction_of_justice_ndp_says.html> [perma.
cc/GF3G-VDVJ]; See also Barrera, supra note 50.
92. See e.g., Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rule 30.03(2)(b) [Civil Procedure];
Grossman v Toronto General Hospital (1983), 41 OR (2d) 457, 146 DLR (3d) 280.
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that would be difcult for the claimants’ lawyers to dispute in a vacuum.93
Again, this course of conduct is inconsistent with the obligations of
parties (and by extension, private law lawyers) under the Rules of Civil
Procedure respecting privileged documents.94 Not surprisingly, there
were consequences associated with the government’s non-disclosure. For
example, one claimant was denied his claim on the basis that he could not
establish the correct timeline respecting a priest’s presence at the school,
evidence of which was within the government’s knowledge at the time of
his claim. As a consequence, he was obligated to re-tell his story of horric
sexual abuse, after asserting a right to have a review and re-review of the
adjudicator’s original decision.95
Pursuant to an Order of the Superior Court in early January 2014, Justice
Perell ordered the government to produce civil and criminal transcripts
relating to St. Anne’s and to revise its narrative accordingly.96 Ultimately,
the government did not appeal the January 2014 Order of Justice Perrell
requiring that it disclose the OPP-related documentation involving St.
Anne’s nor did it seek an amendment of Justice Perell’s order. Rather,
in June 2014 (approximately 4 months after the decision was handed
down), lawyers for the Government sent a letter to the Superior Court
advising that the Government would not produce certain civil proceeding
transcripts of examinations for discovery. The Government, through its
lawyers, claimed it was doing so, on the basis of “settlement privilege and/
or undertakings of condentiality given to the plaintiffs in the pre-IRSSA
settlements.”97 Moreover, the government asserted that non-disclosure of
certain transcripts was consistent with the goals of reconciliation.98 Again,
it is important to note that the private law lawyer, having disagreed with
the decision of a Superior Court judge, would not be entitled to clarify and
unilaterally limit a judge’s order.99
d. Legal argument respecting abuse at St. Anne’s
Separate from the disclosure issues in the St. Anne’s residential school
litigation, there was another troubling aspect involving the adoption by
government lawyers of certain legal positions respecting the scope of
93. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 128.
94. Civil Procedure, supra note 89, Rule 30.02, 30.03.
95. Fontaine v Canada (AG) (May 31, 2018) Toronto Court File No. C63804 (ONCA) (Cost
Submissions of Independent Counsel) at para 20-23 [Fontaine Cost Submissions] [on le with the
author].
96. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59.
97. Fontaine Cost Submissions, supra note 95 at paras 18-19.
98. Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 2487 [Fontaine 2017 ONSC].
99. Ibid at paras 78-79.
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‘abuse’ under the terms of the IRSSA.100 Several of the survivors of St.
Anne’s had made reference to a homemade electrical chair located in the
school and used as a form of punishment for the students. The children
would be strapped to the chair and electrocuted, sometimes to the verge of
or past unconsciousness. Details of the electric chair and its uses had been
documented in the OPP documentation in the government’s possession.
However, during the early IAP process (from approximately 2008–2015),
the government lawyers argued that the use of the electric chair did not
constitute physical abuse under the terms of the IRSSA and therefore
students subject to this ‘treatment’ were not entitled to compensation. A
similar approach was taken with regard to allegations that children at St.
Anne’s had been forced to eat their own vomit as a form of punishment.
These arguments were ultimately withdrawn as a consequence of CrownIndigenous Relations Minister Bennett instructing government counsel to
stop making this argument as a basis for challenging a claimant’s abuse
claims.101
e. Critique of government lawyers in the independent assessment process
The relationship between the government lawyers and St. Anne’s
survivors seeking compensation pursuant to the IAP under the IRSSA has
been described as a “festering sore of suspicion, animosity, distrust and
shared resentment.”102 Notwithstanding Elizabeth Sanderson’s comments
respecting government lawyers’ obligations in litigation, the conduct of
the government lawyers engaged in certain IAP processes at St. Anne’s
does not reect a tempered approach to advocacy or a justice-seeking
ethic. In the context of a second RFD respecting the inadequacy of the
narratives and POI reports on St. Anne’s, the government commented
that “to the extent that any document (source or otherwise) benets a
claimant’s case, it is the claimant and their counsel that bears the onus of
producing that document.”103 This type of comment reects a commitment
to zealous advocacy consistent with hard-fought private civil litigation.
However, if there was ever a time for government lawyers to adopt a
different ethical stance, it is in respect of this quasi-inquisitorial process
100. For more detail of the allegations in this regard, see supra note 50, above.
101. Jorge Barrera, “Ottawa initially fought St. Anne’s residential school electric chair compensation
claims,” CBC News (2 December 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/Indigenous/st-annes-residentialschool-electric-chair-compensation-ght-1.4429594> [perma.cc/M36C-6A9P].
102. See the quote from Justice Perell in Gloria Galloway, “Carolyn Bennett asks Catholic groups to
allow residential school survivors to have documents outlining abuse made public,” The Globe and
Mail (16 January 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/carolyn-bennett-askscatholic-groups-to-allow-residential-school-survivors-to-have-documents-outlining-abuse-madepublic/article37615745/> [perma.cc/SM9P-TC9T].
103. Fontaine 2017 ONSC, supra note 98 at para 64.
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where residential school survivors and the government were attempting to
allocate compensation in respect of historical claims of serious physical
and sexual abuse against members of Indigenous communities.
Thus, insofar as there is any accepted wisdom among legal ethicists
and government lawyers that there ought to be a different ethical
framework for government lawyers, the example of St. Anne’s makes the
development of such a framework an ever more compelling and urgent
task. The various court proceedings that have arisen out of the IAP process
at St. Anne’s suggest that the government lawyers adopted an intensely
adversarial approach to its disclosure requirements and interpretation of
the IRSSA.104 While it is acknowledged that the majority of the claims
made by former residents of St. Anne’s were resolved without a courtinvolved contest, the various RFDs, appeals and positions taken by
government lawyers throughout the IAP process at St. Anne’s suggest a
continued and unchecked adherence by those same government lawyers to
the principle of zealous advocacy. This is inconsistent with reconciliation
and the resolution of residential school abuse claims. In fact, in the context
of some of the legal disputes involving St. Anne’s, there is a major gap
between how Elizabeth Sanderson suggests that government lawyers
should act in the IRSSA and how the government lawyers actually
conducted themselves in respect of St. Anne’s. Sanderson suggests Crown
lawyers involved in cases with Indigenous individuals or groups should
“build reconciliation into the resolution of the litigation” and, in so doing,
“temper the professional duty to raise fearlessly any issue or ask every
question however distasteful, where the public interest factors such as the
scal responsibility, judicial economy, pursuit of justice, healing and harm
reduction, and nation-building compel it.”105 The sentiment was echoed by
Justice Perell when he stated that:
[i]f truth and reconciliation is to be achieved and if nous le regrettons,
we are sorry, nimitataynan, niminchinowesamin, mamiattugut, is to be
a genuine expression of Canada’s request for forgiveness for failing our
Aboriginal Peoples so profoundly, the justness of the system for the
compensation for the victims must be protected. The substantive and
procedural access to justice of the IRSSA, like any class action, must
also be protected and vouched safe. The court has the jurisdiction to
ensure that the IRRSA provides both procedural and substantive access

104. See the following cases as examples in this regard: Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59;
Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2018 ONCA 421; JW Appeal, supra note 67; Fontaine et al v Canada (AG),
2014 MBQB 200 [Fontaine MBQB], Fontaine 2017 ONCA, supra note 65; Fontaine 2016 ONCA,
supra note 57; Fontaine et al v Canada (AG), 2013 ONSC 684; JW SCC, supra note 64.
105. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 132-133.

344 The Dalhousie Law Journal
to justice.106

However, this does not appear to be the approach adopted by the government
lawyers in the St. Anne’s Residential School litigation. Moreover, the
approach taken by the government lawyers in respect of St. Anne’s would
also appear to run contrary to the Department of Justice Values and Ethics
Code of Conduct that came in to effect in February 2013. According to this
internal code of conduct, the Department of Justice is committed to carrying
out its duties in a non-partisan and impartial manner and further committed
to “providing decision-makers with all the information, analysis and advice
they need.”107 Presumably, the withholding of signicant documentation
about the historical abuse at St. Anne’s would appear to undermine the
Department of Justice’s commitment in this regard. The disputes over the
disclosure of information about the abuse at St. Anne’s and, in respect of
certain positions taken by the government lawyers respecting the scope
of the IRSSA, IAP and the nature of compensable abuse all point to an
unbridled approach to zealous advocacy that is focused on winning rather
than a non-partisan and impartial approach to their professional duties.
Thus, again, notwithstanding the technical arguments the government
could make in the context of the IAP process, the more signicant question
is whether they should have made such arguments and what they hoped to
achieve in so doing. What lawyers can do is not the sole test of what they
should do as a matter of legal ethics and professional responsibility.
However, it is not only the failure to produce relevant documentation
or include certain information in the narratives prepared by the
government that causes concern about the professional approach adopted
by the government lawyers involving St. Anne’s. It is also the positions
adopted by the government lawyers when confronted with their nondisclosure and, more importantly, requests for additional information
or more comprehensive and accurate narratives. In such instances, the
government lawyers adopted traditional adversarial positions regarding
the government’s obligations. The lawyers adopted the position that the
OPP information and information from the earlier civil actions were
immaterial, not likely to impact the outcome of the IAP processes, subject
to the deemed undertakings rule, subject to settlement privilege, not
106. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 226.
107. Department of Justice, “Chapter 1: Values” (26 February 2013), online: The Department of Justice
Values and Ethics Code of Conduct <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/vec-cve/c1.html#Chapter1>
[perma.cc/H48H-2K8E]; See also the discussion regarding internal codes of conduct contained in
Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 17 at 180 in which the authors assert that internal codes of conduct
such as the Department of Justice’s code are a better means by which to regulate the unique ethical and
professional duties of government lawyers.
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required respecting persons of interest once they left the school and nally,
that the government was not obligated to produce the civil transcripts
under Schedule D of the IRSSA on the basis of settlement privilege or
the deemed undertaking rule (then subsequently acknowledging no basis
in law for such positions).108 While it is not disputed that the privilege
and the deemed undertaking rule represent legitimate responses of a party
engaged in disclosure disputes in civil litigation, the issue here is the use
of these positions by the government within the IAP and the context of the
IRSSA, and reconciliation more broadly.
As a consequence, the claimants, their lawyers and the TRC were
forced to take the government to court to compel it to fulll its obligations
under the IRSSA. Without such steps being taken, it is likely that the
full scope of the history of abuse at St. Anne’s would not have come to
light. Added to this is the position adopted by the government in respect
of the immateriality of the disclosure ultimately ordered disclosed by
Justice Perell. Specically, the government lawyers took and continue
to take the position that the court-ordered disclosure was immaterial to
the IAP at St. Anne’s. This later position in particular serves to highlight
a disconnect between a narrowly construed and traditionally adversarial
position adopted by the government lawyers in respect of the ‘proof’
of claims in the IAP and the broad reconciliation objectives underlying
the government’s participation in the IRSSA. These broader objectives
contemplated the creation of ongoing narratives that chronicle the history
of abuse perpetrated against the residential school students; however, in
the case of St. Anne’s, an adversarial-based rationalization overtook those
broader objectives.
Recently, the federal government disclosed that it had spent
approximately $2.3 million in respect of the continuing legal disputes
involving the St. Anne’s IAP process.109 Indigenous and Northern Affairs
asserted that this sum includes the cumulative salaries of certain of its
lawyers. The government defended these costs on the basis that the
government was obligated to respond to various legal proceedings brought
by the claimants and the TRC. However, arguably, what necessitated
the government’s need to respond was its failure to disclose relevant
information about the history of abuse at the school.

108. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59; Fontaine Cost Submissions, supra note 95; Interview with
Independent Counsel, 5 October 2018.
109. Jorge Barrera, “Ottawa spent $2.3M on court battles with St. Anne’s residential school survivors,”
CBC News (20 September 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/Indigenous/federal-legal-battle-costsstannes-residential-school-1.4831887> [perma.cc/8Q2C-TJP4].
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The position taken by the government is highly problematic.
Following Justice Perell’s disclosure order of January 2014, government
lawyers advised the court by letter that the government would not comply
with certain aspects of the order. It raises certain troubling questions
about the government lawyers’ views about the application of the rule of
law to government conduct. Notwithstanding that government lawyers’
professional duties are often framed in terms of their role as protectors of
the rule of law and guardians of the public interest, the decision to clarify
a court order sends a message that expressly undermines the rule of law.110
Again, in the private law context, it would be difcult to conceive of a
scenario in which it would be appropriate professionally for a losing party
to advise the court by writing that they did not intend to comply with the
terms of a judicial order made against them. This is particularly troubling
when the order in question required that the party produce information
relevant to the dispute between the parties. In the private law setting,
such action would likely be met with the striking of a party’s pleading,
signicant costs and possibly a contempt order against a party that fails to
comply with a court order.
Finally, and most recently, the federal government has sought
declarations from certain of the IRSSA-designated supervisory courts (in
the form of RFDs and appeals from RFDs) regarding the inapplicability of
the principles of procedural fairness to the IRSSA process and the scope
of judicial review of IAP decisions.111 This has arisen in several contexts
including both the review and re-review of IAP decisions in cases where
the dismissal of a claimant’s claim is linked to insufcient disclosure and/
or awed interpretations of the terms of the IRSSA by an adjudicator.112
Adopting the position that the IRSSA does not incorporate any accepted
norms of procedural fairness (other than those explicitly articulated in the
express terms of the IRSSA) raises difcult questions about the types of
110. Dodek, supra note 2 at 20; Sanderson, supra note 1 at 80.
111. JW SCC, supra note 64; Jorge Barrera, “Ottawa gets sealing order on court document that
undercuts ‘reconciliation agenda’ says NDP MP,” CBC News (14 March 2019), online: <www.cbc.
ca/news/Indigenous/bc-judge-seals-residential-school-compensation-case-documents-1.5054761>
[perma.cc/5C2A-ZXM3]; See also Fontaine v Canada, (Attorney General) 2020 BCSC 63 (17 January
2018) Vancouver L051875 (BSSC) (Request for Direction (Re: Re-Review and Review Jurisdiction
of the Chief Adjudicator and Adjudicators)) at para 2 [Request for Direction]. Fontaine v Canada
(Attorney General) 2020 ONSC 336.
112. Request for Direction, supra note 111. In Fontaine v Canada (AG), Fontaine 2018 BCSC, supra
note 54 at para 41, counsel for Canada submitted that “procedural fairness is an administrative law
construct that the Chief Adjudicator and his designates have used as a means of importing new rights
for IAP claimants, rights for which the parties did not contract”; For further iterations of this argument
see JW SCC, supra note 64; Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2017 BCSC 946; and Fontaine 2017 ONCA,
supra note 65.

A Less Private Practice: Government Lawyers
and Legal Ethics

347

positions that the government should adopt in a quasi-inquisitorial process
that aims to provide compensation for those who suffered abuse at the
hands of the government in the rst place. Moreover, it would appear that
ensuring that IAP adjudicators are impartial and adjudicating without bias
would be components of procedural fairness that are important to the federal
government.113 In attempting to reconcile the role it played in creating the
harm in the rst place, it is questionable whether the government should
adopt positions that seek to undermine or limit accepted norms of fairness
and justice.114 In fact, it is troubling that a party uses a variety of arguments
typically grounded in ensuring a fair procedural process in order to defend
against certain disclosure obligations (i.e., the deemed undertaking
rule) and then rejects notions of procedural fairness when it suits other
objectives such as a claimant’s right to review in circumstances where new
evidence was adduced.115 Finally, to suggest that there is no entitlement
to principles of procedural fairness because the process is contractual in
nature is problematic in light of the nature of the bargain made; namely,
the resolution of claims of serious sexual and physical abuse in a sensitive
and compassionate forum.
In this regard, an RFD was brought by the government involving the
assertion by government lawyers that principles of procedural fairness do
not apply to the residential school settlement process.116 In fact, the position
adopted by the government’s counsel is that the IAP provides a “complete
code for which the parties have specied all of the procedural protects
that they intended.”117 Additionally, the government lawyers in this case
also sought a sealing order from Justice Brown in respect of this RFD.
The government’s position respecting the sealing order was grounded in
protecting the identity of the claimants in the IAP. Notwithstanding the
legitimacy of this concern, it is a little difcult to see how condentiality
might extend to legal arguments made by the government in respect of the
legal interpretation of the terms of the IRSSA.

113. Fontaine 2018 BCSC, supra note 54 at para 48.
114. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Unsettling the Lawyers: Other Forms of Justice in Indigenous Claims
of Expropriation, Abuse and Injustice” (2014) 64:4 U Toronto LJ 620; JW Appeal, supra note 66.
115. For example, Claimant H-15019 who sought a re-review of his claim in respect of abuse at St.
Anne’s once it was determined that evidence contained in the OPP les would have assisted his claims
(Fontaine Cost Submissions, supra note 95 at paras 202-223).
116. Fontaine v The Attorney General of Canada 2020 BCSC 63, (17 January 2018) Vancouver
L051875 (BSSC) (Request for Direction (Re: Re-Review and Review Jurisdiction of the Chief
Adjudicator and Adjudicators)) at para 2; Barrera, supra note 103.
117. Fontaine 2018 BCSC, supra note 54 at paras 39-42; Appeal Record of Independent Counsel in
Fontaine v Canada (AG), BCCA. In this case, the Government sought and was granted a sealing order
respecting its arguments.
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In the circumstances of St. Anne’s Residential School litigation, the
government lawyers would be hard pressed to articulate the legitimate
public interests that informed some of the steps (particularly as it relates
to the OPP disclosure) they took during the IRSSA process. Specically,
if the public interest was to minimize the nancial costs by putting
claimants to the near impossible task of proving claims without the
requisite information and by challenging the validity of claims,118 it would
appear that the government lawyers adopted a very ‘private law’ notion of
their role: they infused public lawyering with private values.119 However,
if the public interest that the government claimed to be pursuing was
reconciliation (and a fundamental change in Canada’s relationship with
Indigenous people),120 the withholding of 12,000 pages of information
about the abuse at St. Anne’s residential school and adoption of hard-line
litigation tactics and positions undermines meaningful reconciliation.
III. A different direction for government lawyers
Having offered a critical take on the St. Anne’s litigation, I will canvass some
different approaches to re-framing the ethical duties and responsibilities of
government lawyers. In so doing, I will focus more particularly on the
potential benets that a justice ethic might add. In an effort to articulate
a different approach to legal ethics for government lawyers, differing
emphasis has been placed on the scope of the government lawyer’s
ability to access and exercise public power and their responsibilities in
respect of their role as guardians of the rule of law and promoters of the
public interest given this public authority.121 These approaches will also
be canvassed in the course of this discussion with the hope that the reframing of government lawyers’ ethical duties might build on these earlier
approaches. Before canvassing these approaches, it is worth noting that
not all theories of legal ethics contemplate a higher or different standard
118. The chief adjudicator of the Indian Residential School Adjudication Secretariat, Dan Ish, has
indicated that there were three times more applications for the IAP process than had been expected
at the outset, thereby extending the duration of the IAP and the associated costs: Kathleen Martens,
“Outgoing Chief Adjudicator criticizes lawyers in residential school compensation process,” APTN
National News (11 March 2013), online: <aptnnews.ca/2013/03/11/outgoing-chief-adjudicatorcriticizes-lawyers-in-residential-school-compensation-process/> [perma.cc/TF9E-WZCY].
119. Berenson, supra, note 16 at 45. It is worth noting that as of 2014, there were approximately
17,000 resolved residential school claims totaling about 2 billion dollars. Originally, Canada had put
aside a $1.9 billion fund in respect of the CEP payments. Additionally, Canada agreed to “fund the IAP
to the extent necessary to ensure its implementation” (Fontaine 2016 ONCA, supra note 57 at para 21).
120. Principles, supra note 20.
121. Dodek, supra note 2 at 20: All members of the legal profession have a professional responsibility
to uphold respect for the rule of law however there are particular statutory duties placed on the attorney
general and its representatives to ensure that public matters are carried out in accordance with the law.
See also Sanderson, supra note 1 at 84.
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of conduct for government lawyers. In this regard, Andrew Martin notes,
“others—almost all of whom are government lawyers—argue that there
are no special ethical obligations on government lawyers. While they
largely recognize ‘public interest’ duties, these commentators argue that
such duties do not constitute ethical duties.”122 A further critique of the
call for a higher or different ethical standard for government lawyers
is that such a higher standard presupposes a lower standard for the rest
of the profession; an assumption that is not particularly palatable to the
profession or the public (and certainly not accepted in the context of this
paper).123
Despite objections over the application or appropriateness of a different
ethical standard for government lawyers, the reality is that such standard
already exists for crown prosecutors. As a response to and check on the
public power exercised by crown prosecutors, they have specic duties.
These duties restrain the government’s ability to pursue, prosecute and
punish individuals who have allegedly contravened the law. While these
duties are situated in the criminal context, it is entirely reasonable that
there may be other types of proceedings brought forward by government
and/or that government defends that can and do have serious consequences
for individuals or groups.124 Arguably, government lawyers acting in these
contexts would be subject to the same justice-seeking ethical duties as
crown prosecutors.
However, before exploring the application of a justice ethic in more
detail, this paper takes account of some of the existing approaches to
government lawyer ethics that have contributed to the discourse in this
eld and in so doing, provides a basis for a distinct ethical approach for
government lawyers. The intent is to build upon aspects of these existing
perspectives in legal ethics to formulate a theory of legal ethics that takes
account of the unique position, power and challenges of government
lawyers. One such approach is grounded in the government’s democratic
and representational role. The scope of a government’s ‘representative’
nature is that it is representative of all citizens, including those who
disagree with and challenge the government’s policies or conduct. In light
of its representative nature, it is imperative that governments remember its
obligation to represent all citizens when in an adversarial relationship with

122. Martin & Telfer, supra note 10 at 454 citing Dodek, supra note 2.
123. Everingham v Ontario (1992), 8 OR (3d) 121, 88 DLR (4th) 755 (Div Ct).
124. Examples of such cases might include the operation of certain publicly-owned facilities;
regulation of medical drugs; the management of blood transfusion cases; solitary connement in
prisons, Indigenous child welfare cases.
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one (or more) of its citizens.125 This obligation also extends to the lawyers
acting on behalf of the government. When representing a government
entity that is in opposition to a legitimate claim of one of its citizens, the
government lawyer must also take meaningful account of the fact that
their client’s adversaries are also its citizens. In this context, government
lawyers cannot adopt a neutral partisanship approach to lawyering that
declines to engage in a meaningful assessment of the implications of its
client’s actions on an adversarial party.
The rationale underlying this approach is similar to that underlying the
responsibilities placed on crown prosecutors in the criminal context. More
specically, in lawyering legitimate claims made against it by its citizens,
the “nature of the government’s relationship to that citizen is different from
the relationship a private disputant would have with that citizen, and that
the nature of this relationship shapes the nature of the lawyer’s duties in his
or her representation of government.”126 In this capacity, they adopt a ‘duty
of fair dealing’ whereby government lawyers recognize that the minimum
requirements placed on private lawyers in legal proceedings in respect
of adversaries are insufcient in legal disputes involving government
entities and private citizens.127 While the basis for this approach is clearly
grounded in notions of democracy and representative government, the
articulation of how this duty might operate in practice is more general in
its application. For instance, Cotter suggests that fullling this duty would
require government lawyers to admit “what should reasonably be admitted,
conceding what should reasonably be conceded, [and] accommodating
what should reasonably be accommodated.”128
This qualication alone does not go far enough in re-dening the
scope of the government lawyer’s ethical responsibilities in litigation
outside the particular context of crown prosecutors. A ‘duty of fair
dealing’ places certain obligations on government lawyers to recognize
the legitimate and conicting interests of its citizens. They must act fairly
when engaging in legal conict with such citizens. However, it does not
provide a mechanism by which to balance legitimate and contradictory
interests of citizens and government. As such, as an ethical consideration,
a ‘duty of fair dealing’ may be more appropriate as a guiding principle
for the government ‘clients’ instructing government lawyers than the
government lawyers acting on those instructions. In addition, this duty
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Cotter, “Legal Accountability,” supra note 2 at 70.
Cotter, “Evolving ‘Public Interest,’” supra note 2 at 160.
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does not contain a descriptive account of what constitutes ‘fair dealing’
in the context of the actual steps to be taken by government lawyers in
a given case. Moreover, when such aspirational language (without more
detailed articulation) is confronted with the pressures associated with the
deeply ingrained traditional professional framework of zealous advocacy
and neutral partisanship, it would not be surprising that many government
lawyers would default to the traditional approach to professional conduct.
It is for these reasons, among others, that the extension of a justice-seeking
ethic (currently articulated only in the context of criminal prosecutions)
could provide a helpful framework for ethical government lawyering more
generally.
The duty of fair dealing is also consistent with another approach to
government lawyer ethics that recognizes the unique powers exercised
by government lawyers. Specically, the basis for this approach to and
justication for a higher standard of ethical conduct for government
lawyers is grounded in the assertion that government lawyers exercise
power on behalf of the state.129 In this regard, Adam Dodek states that:
[g]overnment lawyers interpret, advise and advocate on the powers and
duties of the Crown. In so doing, government lawyers exercise public
power. This exercise of public power is therefore the key distinction
between government lawyers and all other lawyers. This is why it is an
oversimplication, an understatement and is misleading to characterize
government lawyers as lawyers for an organization.130

This imposition of a higher standard associated with the exercise of public
power is, in part, informed by the attorney general’s responsibility (and
all those lawyers who act on behalf of the attorney general) to uphold the
rule of law. In effect, it is the government lawyer’s responsibility to ensure
that the actions and policies of the government are consistent with the rule
of law.131 Along with the recognition that government lawyers exercise
public power (and, as such, should be held to a higher standard of conduct)
129. Dodek, supra note 2 at 18.
130. Ibid. For a contrasting view respecting the assertion that government lawyers should be subject
to a higher standard of professional conduct see Deborah McNair, “In the Service of the Crown: Are
Ethical Obligations Different for Government Counsel” (2006) 84:3 Can Bar Rev 501 and John Mark
Keyes, “The Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel” (2009) 3 JPPL 453.
131. This assertion has led to different characterizations of the importance of the solicitor–client
relationship between government lawyers and the governmental entity they advise. Morris &
Nishikawa, supra note 17 suggests that the solicitor–client relationship must be jealously protected in
order to ensure that government lawyers are able to provide meaningful advice to government bodies
regarding the legality of a proposed course of action. Similarly, John Mark Keyes suggest that this
relationship is grounded in a duty of loyalty and trust that is needed such that governmental ‘clients’
can rely on their legal advisers to provide sound advice in Keyes, supra note 2.
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is the corresponding recognition that there are specic contexts outside
of criminal prosecutions in which government lawyers are expected to
act differently. Further examples of these include where the Honour of
the Crown is invoked in legal matters engaging Indigenous groups or
where government is engaged in litigation involving vulnerable parties,
regardless of whether those parties are represented by counsel.132 In these
instances, the objective for the government lawyer is not winning the case
on behalf of the government. Rather, it is ensuring that there is a fair and
just outcome in the resolution of the matter.
The suggestion that there should be a higher standard of conduct when
vulnerable parties are involved is a worthy objective, but it raises certain
questions. For instance, it tends to not address whether the presence of a
well-lawyered opposing vulnerable party would relieve the government
lawyers of conducting themselves in accordance with such a higher
standard.133 In fact, there is a concern that a well-lawyered opposing party
would alleviate the government lawyer’s duty to deal with the party fairly and
result in a retreat to more traditional modes of adversarial professionalism.
In addition to obligations stemming from the government lawyers’ role as
guardians of the rule of law and/or democratic representatives, a further
consideration engages government lawyers’ public interest duties. This
is framed in terms of the government lawyers’ additional role as public
servant; a role that requires that the government lawyer act independently
of partisan politics.134
Taking account of the important contributions that these approaches
make as well as the challenges associated with implementing a duty of
fair dealing and a public interest or rule of law-based higher standard of
conduct, the next section of this paper discusses the merits of applying a
justice-seeking ethic to government lawyering outside the context of crown
prosecutors. It also addresses the criticisms associated with this approach
as well as the ways in which such an ethic might inform government
lawyers’ practice outside of the criminal context.
1. Toward a justice ethic
Interestingly, the previous sampling of approaches to government
lawyer ethics incorporate by comparison the specic ethical duties and
responsibilities of crown prosecutors. However, neither go so far as to
suggest that a justice ethic should be adopted by all government lawyers
working in an adversarial context. This section intends to make just that
132. Dodek, supra note 2 at 26.
133. Berenson, supra note 16 at 45.
134. Martin & Telfer, supra note 10 at 454.
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suggestion. In drawing upon the benets of these earlier approaches as
well as the limitations associated with them, my argument is that the
justice ethic could be expanded to encompass government lawyers acting
outside the criminal context. In addition to discussing the merits and
challenges associated with adopting such an approach, this section will
briey examine those aspects of legal practice that would be subject to
a justice ethic (taking account of the lessons learned from St. Anne’s) as
well as propose language that could form the basis of a professional rule
in this regard.
In the context of the crown prosecutor, the justice ethic has resulted in
both a general direction to act fairly as well as the articulation of particular
duties and responsibilities owed by crown prosecutors when prosecuting
criminal cases. The adoption of a justice-seeking ethic reects the
signicant power and responsibility that criminal prosecutors have over
citizens. Over time, this ethic has been articulated through a variety of
sources including case-law, the rules of professional conduct and internal
manuals. The result is a framework that more contextually governs how
crown prosecutors are expected to conduct themselves when prosecuting
cases. As such, the adoption of a justice ethic reects a move away from a
broad ethical standard that is informed by notions of neutral partisanship
and zealous advocacy as the lawyer’s primary duties. Notions of neutral
partisanship and zealous advocacy are, at a minimum, not easy to apply in
the context of certain government lawyers and more seriously, may have
grave effects on those citizens subject to government lawyers who adopt
such an approach.
One of the benets of expanding a justice-seeking ethic among a
broader range of government lawyers is that it has already been subject to
denition within the context of adversarial proceedings. Thus, the concept
is more than an aspirational objective; it has infused and, in turn, altered the
role of specic government lawyers within a particular practice context,
namely crown prosecutors. One such example of this has played out in
the context of the crown prosecutor’s disclosure obligations; an example
that is particularly relevant in the context of St. Anne’s. In Stinchcombe,
Justice Sopinka stated that, “the fruits of the investigation which are in [the
crown’s] possession are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a
conviction, but the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is
done.”135 This decision had, in part, been inuenced by the ndings of The
Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution, which had
determined that the Crown’s failure to disclose certain statements to the
135. Stinchcombe, supra note 42.
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defence was a contributing factor in the miscarriage of justice that resulted
when Donald Marshall was convicted of murder.136 As a consequence of
Stinchcombe, there is an obligation on crown prosecutors to disclose all
relevant information including evidence that might prove to be exculpatory
for the defence.
This does not mean that there is a comprehensive framework. But,
unlike other ethical articulations, there is at least a starting point for
eshing out this ethical approach in more concrete terms. Thus, in certain
legal contexts (e.g., claims as against the government and matters like the
IRSSA), a justice-seeking ethic could assist government lawyers in better
achieving their commitment to the public interest. In so doing, it might
improve the public’s perceptions of the role of the government lawyer
who more often than not becomes the ‘face’ of government in high prole
cases.137 Moreover, an expanded justice ethic can provide the individual
government lawyer with a better structural framework in which to operate.
This is in contrast to the private law zealous advocate framework, which
fails to account adequately for the unique duties and interests required of
government lawyers and the needs of the citizens–litigants.
2. Criticisms of a justice ethic
While there are benets to expanding the notion of a justice ethic beyond
the strictly prosecutorial context, it is necessary to address certain
criticisms associated with adopting such an approach. One of the most
compelling critiques involves the concern that, without signicant
corresponding structural and regulatory reform, a justice ethic remains
largely philosophical. At best, justice is a “contested concept” such
that “working out the meaning of justice, and thus the content of the
prosecutor’s duty to seek justice, requires one assign weights or priorities
to different components of justice, such as security, respect for dignity,
freedom from arbitrary harassment, and protection of rights. Others may
assign different weights or priorities however.”138 In short, its scope is
subject to indeterminate application or manipulation. Thus, subjective
interpretations of what constitutes ‘justice’ within a case may allow a
government lawyer to justify conduct that is anything but ethical. This
is further complicated by the fact that, on a regular basis, prosecutors
136. The Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution: Digest of Findings and
Recommendations (Halifax: The Commission, 1989).
137. An interesting example of this is the case of St. Anne’s in which the public’s perceptions of the
federal government’s commitment to reconciliation are played out in the negative publicity associated
with certain of the legal steps taken by the government lawyers involved in the IAP and related
litigation on St. Anne’s.
138. Wendel, supra note 40 at 160.
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exercise discretion that requires an analysis and balancing of competing
values that underscore conceptions of justice; an analysis that may not
be thoroughly undertaken by the courts when called upon to review a
prosecutor’s conduct.139
Moreover, as an aspirational objective that is meant to inform actual
procedures and processes, it is not consistently enforced or enforceable.140
In addition to being open to interpretation and, more troublingly,
manipulation, the vagueness of the term ‘justice’ raises difcult theoretical
and philosophical questions about differing conceptual bases for justice
as a guiding principle. In considering the principle of ‘justice’ that is to
inform ethical legal decision-making and practice, are government lawyers
to consider a procedural form of justice that leaves outcomes out of the
conversation or a substantive concept of justice that potentially treads on
government policy?141 As a consequence, even when government lawyers
are attempting to ‘seek justice,’ it could mean different things to different
lawyers in different contexts.
These interpretive challenges are further complicated by the dual role
played by government lawyers as both public employees and advocates
and by a further question about the implications of a civil versus criminal
context for government lawyers. While there is a clearer understanding
of the consequences associated with government lawyers failing to seek
justice in the criminal context (i.e., the potential loss of an individual’s
liberty), the analysis becomes somewhat murkier in the civil context. In
the civil context, the dispute is often grounded in questions of tortious
or contractual liability and the resulting scope of compensation to an
aggrieved party. An argument might be made that these types of disputes
do not approach the level of consequence like that of the criminal context.
However, it is possible to consider a variety of civil contexts in which
the actions of the state may have a “serious and profound effect” on an
individual’s life.142 As a consequence, in these particular civil contexts, the
government’s legal representatives could be subject to a different standard
of conduct. In contrasting government lawyers’ conduct in a criminal
context with conduct in a civil context, the question becomes whether a
citizen is “less entitled to this standard of fairness and evenhandedness
because the matter does not involve criminal proceedings against him
139. Alice Woolley, “Reconceiving the Standard Conception of the Prosecutor’s Role” (2017) 95:3
Can Bar Rev 795 at 820-822.
140. Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2 at 4, 9, 13.
141. Stuart Hampshire, Justice is Conict (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).
142. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J), [1999] 3 SCR 46 at para
49, 177 DLR (4th) 124.
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or her?”143 The IRSSA and the IAP provide concrete examples of noncriminal proceedings that would benet from the application of a justice
ethic.
A nal criticism that is important to address in the context of a
justice ethic involves the fact that, while government lawyers may adopt
such an ethic, the private lawyers against whom they are acting may
continue to conduct themselves in accordance with the traditional model
of professionalism. In such circumstances, even government lawyers
attempting to adhere to a justice framework may be tempted to ‘ght re
with re.’ Moreover, are we asking only a certain group of lawyers, namely
government lawyers, to pledge allegiance to competing duties— justice and
a corresponding disinterested search for the truth and zealous advocacy?144
Two considerations might be raised in reply. First, just because it is difcult
to articulate a standard does not mean it is not a worthy undertaking. In
fact, seeking justice is and should remain one of the core tenets of the legal
profession. And second, by engaging in a discussion about the nature of a
justice ethic that results in a clearer articulation of objectives and concrete
guidelines, government lawyers operating in the civil context would be
able to respond to such pressures and conduct themselves accordingly.
Thus, to do ‘justice,’ it is imperative that a series of more denitive
principles and rules be created that will guide lawyers’ conduct in particular
legal contexts.145 While, in the context of crown prosecutor’s existing
duties, many of the concrete expressions of the crown’s duties have been
articulated by the courts, it does not mean the courts can or should carry all
of the burden of developing an ethical framework for government lawyers.
In fact, it is worth noting that the courts’ work in this regard has also been
tempered by a broad degree of discretion that courts bestow on crown
prosecutors in their practice. Justice L’Heureux-Dube has suggested that
for the criminal justice system to work well, the Crown must possess a fair
deal of discretion extending to all aspects of the trial process.146 Moreover,
as the litigation involving the IAP processes under the IRSSA has
demonstrated, courts across the country have struggled to dene the scope
of their review of the government’s responsibilities in the process.147 For
example in Attorney General of Canada v JW and Reo Law Corporation,
the Attorney General took the position that the supervisory judges under
143. Cotter, “Evolving ‘Public Interest,’” supra note 2 at 160-161.
144. Woolley, supra note 133 at 825.
145. Berenson, supra note 16 at 45.
146. R v Cook, [1997] 1 SCR 1113, 146 DLR (4th) 437.
147. JW Appeal, supra note 67 at paras 27-30. This case has recently been considered by the SCC, see
JW SCC, supra note 64.
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the IRSSA have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of or judicially review a
decision of an adjudicator under the IAP–except in exceptional cases. The
supervisory court’s ability to review decisions of an adjudicator is limited
to a correctness standard. Essentially, the government argued that there
are no procedural protections afforded to the claimants outside the terms
articulated in the IRRSA.148 These arguments underscore the concern that
judicial review of IAP adjudicators’ decisions would ultimately impact
and extend the completion of the process.149 The further consequence is
that supervisory judges are meant to defer to the adjudicative process and
by extension, not oversee the government lawyers’ conduct.
In light of these criticisms, a better approach would engage the
provincial law societies as well as the Federation of Law Societies
in drafting more guidelines for government lawyers. As it stands, the
provincial professional codes have taken small steps to carve out and
articulate specic rules and directives for prosecutors.150 As an example,
the commentary under Rule 5.1-3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct
in Ontario state that the prosecutor’s “prime duty is not to seek to convict
but to see that justice is done through a fair trial on the merits.”151 This
responsibility expressly extends to the crown’s disclosure obligations.
Arguably, similar language could be added within this commentary or
in respect of a separate rule or sub-rule to include government lawyers
practicing outside the criminal prosecutorial context. For instance, as a
starting point, the Model Code of Professional Conduct might include
language that states,
(1) When acting on behalf of the Crown in adversarial proceedings, a
lawyer must act fairly and dispassionately to ensure that justice is done.
(2) In seeing that justice is done in court proceedings as well as
proceedings before boards, administrative tribunals, arbitrators and other
forms of adjudication, a lawyer acting on behalf of the Crown engaged
in adversarial proceedings must fairly assist the tribunal to arrive at the
truth, must seek impartially to have the whole of the relevant evidence
placed fairly before the tribunal, and must seek to assist the tribunal with
adequate submissions of law that enable the law to be properly applied
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to the facts.152

While this rule attempts to cover signicant ground in terms of the scope
of the government lawyer’s duty, it could ultimately be parceled out into
several sub-rules and commentary that attempt to capture certain aspects
of a justice framework. Namely, the rules would need to encapsulate
the type of lawyer subject to the rule, the nature of the legal setting in
which the lawyer was operating and the scope of her duties within that
setting. Once the general principle underscoring the justice framework is
established, additional rules that reect other concrete aspects of the crown
prosecutor’s duties to seek justice might be added to the rule and extended
to apply to government lawyers outside the realm of crown prosecutors.
The Directive on Civil Litigation Involving Indigenous Peoples could assist
in establishing a coherent set of rules consistent with a ‘justice’ ethic.
In developing such rules, it would be helpful to draw on David Wilkins’
suggestion regarding the need for and creation of practice-specic rules.
His ‘mid-level’ rules take account of both the legal realism associated
with the practice of law in particular contexts as well as an overarching
commitment to the systemic values that are chosen to infuse all practice
spheres.153 In creating mid-level rules that are more attuned to particular
practice contexts, it is important to consider the specic legal task, the legal
subject matter, the status of the player (plaintiff or defendant), the type of
lawyer and the nature of the client.154 Within the context of government
lawyers, the relevant factors that would serve to dene both the scope
and content of mid-level rules are multi-focused—the articular legal task
at hand, assuming that the steps of civil litigation might be further subdivided; the subject matter (important in delineating the overall types of
matters that would be subject to a justice ethic); and the status of the lawyer
(in this case, to a lesser extent whether the government lawyer is acting as
plaintiff or defendant). All these factors would together set parameters on
what ‘seeking justice’ looks like in more particular legal contexts.
Consistent with the creation of even more specic mid-level rules that
articulate particular duties and responsibilities within a specic practice
152. As a basis for this rule, see New South Wales Government, Law Profession Uniform Conduct
(Barristers) Rules 2015, online: <www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/regulation/2015/243/
partadvocacyru/rule83> [perma.cc/H2YL-YDLK] at Rule 83, which has been altered and expanded
for the purposes of this discussion. See also Law Society of Alberta, Code of Conduct, Rule 12
respecting the clarication that a “client of a lawyer employed by the government is the government
itself and not a Board, Agency, Minister or Crown Corporation”; See also Wendel, supra note 40 at
160.
153. Wilkins, supra note 49 at 515.
154. Ibid at 517.
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setting, it is important that work be done to identify better when a justiceseeking ethic would arise in legal problems that government lawyers face
in their daily sphere of practice. By more specically addressing those
problems, government lawyers are not left to interpret how a contested and
philosophical concept of justice applies. Rather, it should be considered
how it is best operationalized in a particular setting given certain guidelines
and expectations. Again, the drafters of these rules could draw on the
government’s own directive respecting civil litigation with Indigenous
Peoples. While the development of a justice ethic and accompanying rules
is meant to extend beyond litigation involving Indigenous Peoples, the
language and substance of those particular principles would be applicable
in a broader context and in respect of any litigation as between the Crown
and an Indigenous group. Moreover, incorporating elements of the federal
government’s directive within newly drafted professional rules can ensure
that the rules apply across Canada and in respect of both federal and
provincial government lawyers.
In the context of St. Anne’s, an enhanced disclosure requirement that
included production of the inculpatory as well as exculpatory information
would have dramatically changed the dynamic of the IAP process both in
terms of administration of the process and perceptions about fairness of
the process. If the government lawyers’ conduct had been infused with
a justice-seeking ethic, they would have been required to produce all
relevant information: the OPP les would have been produced and there
would likely not have been a need for multiple litigious RFD’s as well
as multiple narratives over the span of seven years. More importantly,
claimants who had suffered signicant and traumatic abuse at St. Anne’s
would not have been denied their claims or forced to recount extremely
painful stories in an effort to prove claims originally denied due to a lack
of disclosure. There would have been a different perception of the role of
the government and its lawyers in the process. This latter consideration
cannot be downplayed in the context of reconciliation.
Taking the disclosure example in St. Anne’s IAP process further,
the production of all relevant information pursuant to a justice-seeking
ethical obligation is consistent with a commitment to nding the truth
rather than defeating a claim. It is in keeping with the government’s
professed commitment to reconciliation. An ethical approach to practice
that requires government lawyers to seek justice would also cause those
same government lawyers to ask themselves what would constitute justice
in a given case. And, in the case of the government lawyer receiving
instructions from or providing advice to a government department as
“client,” a formalized professional duty to promote justice would likely
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require that the individual lawyer engage in a dialogue about justice
with that instructing department. Certainly in the case of St. Anne’s, if
the government lawyers contemplated how justice might be affected in
the circumstances, it is not likely that seeking justice would entail the
withholding of information from abuse victims, long drawn out procedural
battles or the requirement that victims of abuse be required to tell and retell their story in order to obtain compensation.
While this paper has focused on the example of disclosure, a justice
approach would extend beyond disclosure requirements. For instance, the
crown’s responsibility to seek justice also extends to the manner in which
it presents evidence in a criminal proceeding.155 Specically, in keeping
with an obligation to secure just results, the crown prosecutor is “not
at liberty to curate the evidence [at trial], excising anything that might
be exculpatory. To do so is to place too high a premium on ‘winning.’
It is to lose sight of the Crown’s primary duty to present the case fairly
and in a manner that will secure a just result.”156 Thus, in extending the
underlying justice principle to litigation outside the criminal context, we
could explore how the responsibility to seek justice would inform different
aspects of the litigation process from pre-trial and preliminary procedural
matters through to the completion of a trial and beyond—particularly as it
relates to the appropriateness of an appeal.
While the impact on some of the aspects of civil litigation can be
imported from the criminal context, some will need to be constituted
anew. For instance, in learning from the lessons provided in the case of St.
Anne’s, it would be important to import a justice ethic into the government’s
decision to proceed with certain procedural steps within a proceeding as
well as the position taken by the government in the course of procedural
motions. Infusing procedural motions with a justice ethic would attempt to
ensure that government lawyers are pursuing procedural orders that are just
and responding to procedural motions of opposing parties with positions
that reect a commitment to obtaining a just result overall. Again, in these
circumstances, it is and would be incumbent on government lawyers to
act in accordance with a justice ethic notwithstanding any action taken by
opposing parties and private lawyers who continue to act in a traditionally
adversarial manner. While ultimately the goal is to ensure that all lawyering
is infused with a justice ethic, the purpose of this paper is to ensure
that the focus remains on the steps and positions taken by government
lawyers. Thus, when initiating procedural motions as well as responding
155. R v Ahmed, 2015 ONCA 751; R v Hillis, 2016 ONSC 451 [Hillas].
156. Hillas, supra note 155 at para 24.
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to procedural motions brought by opposing counsel, government lawyers
should ask whether the positions they adopt contribute to the fair and just
resolution of the litigation rather than winning a motion at all costs.157
Such an inquiry might prevent the adoption of positions that serve to delay
and obfuscate proceedings.158
For instance, the government’s position regarding the limited
supervisory role of the courts in the IRSSA may serve an argument of
nality and certainty often made in litigation processes but again, these are
not purely litigious processes. Alternatively, adopting a justice ethic in this
circumstance might require that government lawyers balance the need for
nality, as an adversarial objective, with the promotion of reconciliation,
the voice of survivors and recompense of abuse of all victims of
residential schools. In another example, maintaining arguments about the
interpretation of the term ‘resident’ for the purpose of denying a minor’s
sexual assault claim might also be better served by a justice analysis.159
In that case, a claimant had remained in a guardianship relationship at
the school after nishing her schooling because her family could not
care for her at home. While in a guardian relationship at the school, she
earned room and board, but was sexually assaulted by an adult employee
of the residential school on school grounds. Government counsel took the
position that, as she was paid by the school (essentially earning her room
and board), she was not a student nor a resident, but rather an employee.
As an employee, it was argued that she was not entitled to compensation
under the terms of the IRSSA. However, suggesting that a minor and former
student who was sexually assaulted at the school by an adult employee is
not entitled to compensation raises cause for concern in that it relies on a
technical and narrow interpretation of the terms of IRRSA; the goal being
the limiting of claims rather than redress for victims.160 Again, in such a
case, pursuing justice may check the use of interpretive arguments that
serve to limit legitimate payable claims at the expense of other objectives
that the government is pursuing including, “right[ing] the wrongs that

157. It is the assertion of the independent counsel involved in St. Anne’s that the government
maintained positions respecting the applicability of settlement privilege and/or deemed undertakings
that had little or legal basis (no legal authority or evidence of the examinations being for the purpose
of settlement) and that such was acknowledged by the government in the course of the proceedings.
See Fontaine Cost Submissions, supra note 92 at para 44.
158. See reference to the government position that there is no right to procedural fairness in IRSSA
and no right of appeal from the decision of the Chief Adjudicator: Fontaine MBQB, supra note 104.
159. Ibid at paras 41-44.
160. Ibid.
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were committed against to whom it [Canada] was in the relationship of a
caregiver.”161
Conclusion
The delineation of appropriate ethical conduct based on a justice-seeking
ethic disabuses government lawyers of a commitment to a private
law adversarial approach to civil litigation. Moreover, by assessing
objectives through a justice lens, a more ethically sustainable approach to
professionalism that moves beyond a commitment to neutral partisanship
and is more reective of the government’s duty to its citizenry more
broadly is developed.162 This approach needs to be supplemented by and
be directed by a corresponding set of practical rules that take account
of the operationalization of justice ethic in daily practice and different
settings. While there remains much work to do in putting esh on the
bones of this ethical approach, the acknowledgement that a new approach
is needed is a start. This is particularly so in circumstances like St. Anne’s.
In many ways, a rst step has been taken by former Attorney General
Wilson-Raybould. She recognized the need for a new approach to the
government’s engagement in litigation with Indigenous groups. This
would be an excellent place to begin a much deeper and broader debate on
the professional and ethical responsibilities of government lawyers.

161. Ibid at para 65.
162. Trevor CW Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 51.

